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Natural Disaster Recovery Work Plans for Queensland and Victoria. 
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Regional Australia  Department  of  Regional  Australia,  Local  Government, 
Arts  and  Sport  (from  14  December  2011)  –  formerly 
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1. The  eastern  states  were  subject  to  widespread  flooding  during  the 
2010–11  Australian  spring  and  summer  seasons,  and  Queensland  was  also 
impacted by a number of tropical cyclones. In this context, on 27 January 2011, 
the  Prime Minister  announced  that  preliminary  estimates  indicated  that  the 
Australian Government would need to contribute $5.6 billion to the rebuilding 




accountability measures  to ensure value  for money would be obtained  in  the 
rebuilding of flood‐affected regions. In particular: 
 to  ensure  the  Commonwealth’s  interests  are  protected  and  there  is 
effective  coordination  across  levels  of  government,  two  Australian 
Government  representatives  are  on  the  board  of  the  Queensland 
Reconstruction Authority (QRA)1; 
 the  Australian  Government  Reconstruction  Inspectorate  was  being 
established  with  the  objective  of  providing  assurance  that  value  for 
money  was  received  in  the  recovery  effort.  The  Inspectorate  is  to 
perform its functions by: 
 working collaboratively with any reconstruction agency on  the 
development  of  contractual  frameworks,  tendering  processes 
and project management systems used; 
 where  necessary,  undertaking  scrutiny  of  requests  for 
reimbursement  by  local  government  for  completed 
reconstruction projects; 
 undertaking  scrutiny  of  contracts  and  benchmark  prices,  to 
ensure value for money; 
                                                 
1  QRA was established by the Queensland Government to provide, manage and coordinate a range of 
recovery and reconstruction programs on behalf of the state. This includes a range of state and 
Commonwealth funding and assistance programs, including NDRRA. 
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 undertaking  scrutiny  prior  to  execution  for  complex  or  high 
value contracts; 
 monitoring achievement against agreed milestones; and 
 responding  to and  investigating complaints or  issues raised by 
the public; and 
 a  dedicated  taskforce  (the  National  Disaster  Recovery  Taskforce, 





arrangements. They are also  in addition  to  the establishment of a Secretaries’ 
Steering  Committee  and  the  National  Disaster  Recovery  Cabinet  Sub‐
Committee,  the appointment of  the Minister Assisting on Queensland Floods 
Recovery  and,  for  Victoria,  the  Minister  for  Regional  Australia,  Regional 
Development and Local Government was given an oversight role in respect of 
recovery.  Further,  Queensland  established  the  Queensland  Reconstruction 
Authority.  In  Victoria,  the  state  established  the  Secretaries’  Flood  Recovery 
Group and the Senior Officials’ Coordination Group (with one Commonwealth 
member on the latter). 
4. To  give  effect  to  the  additional  oversight  and  accountability 
arrangements3,  separate  National  Partnership  Agreements4  (NPAs)  were 
signed with the Queensland and Victorian state governments in February and 
May 2011  respectively.  Among  other  matters5,  the  NPAs  required  that  a 
                                                 
2  Initially, the Taskforce was funded to operate until the end of 2012. The May 2012 Budget included 
additional funding to extend the operation of the Taskforce by one year. This was in response to the 
increased time granted to the Queensland Government for the completion of reconstruction projects. 
3  The existing NDRRA arrangements continue to apply to expenditure covered by the NPAs. These 
arrangements include states providing audited financial statements to acquit expenditure, including 
expenditure of advance payments. 
4  The NPA with Queensland relates to the reconstruction of communities that were affected by the 
2010–11 floods and Tropical Cyclone Yasi. The NPA with Victoria relates to the early 2011 flooding in 
Victoria. NDRRA continues to apply to those natural disasters covered by the NPAs, with payments to 
the states controlled by Emergency Management Australia (EMA) within the Attorney-General’s 
Department (which administers NDRRA).  
5  For example, the NPAs also included provisions relating to the Australian and state Auditors-General 
undertaking complementary performance audit work in respect to the NDRRA funding governed by each 
NPA. 
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assist with  reconstruction and/or  recovery. Each work plan was  to be agreed 
between  the  relevant  state  and  the  Australian  Government.  The  NPAs  also 
included reporting obligations in respect to the work plans, with these reports 
to include: 
 progress  against  the  relevant  work  plan  and  in  meeting  specified 
project milestones and outcomes;  
 progress  with  expenditure  under  NDRRA,  including  advice  on  the 
level of expenditure in key areas of the reconstruction effort;  
 revisions to estimates of costs; and  
 progress  against  community  recovery  plans,  including  the  extent  to 
which milestones are being achieved. 
5. The Taskforce was the lead Australian Government agency in terms of 
developing  the work  plans with Queensland  and Victoria.  The  Taskforce  is 
also responsible for: 
 providing secretariat support to the Inspectorate; 
 reporting  to  relevant  Ministers  and  providing  the  National  Disaster 
Recovery  Cabinet  Sub‐Committee  with  monthly  progress  reports  on 
state  plans  for  recovery,  including  updated  estimates  of  the 
Commonwealth’s liability under NDRRA; 
 assessing spending on recovery and reconstruction efforts arising from 
the  flooding  and  cyclone  events  so  as  to  ensure  consistency  with 
NDRRA; 
 assessing  requests  for  Commonwealth  funding  assistance  outside  of 
those automatically triggered by a NDRRA declaration; and 
 ensuring  that  a  strategic  approach  is  taken  to  reconstruction  and 
recovery efforts. 
6. The  Taskforce  and  the  relevant  state  body  completed  reviews  of  the 
Queensland  and  Victorian  NPAs  in  2012.  The  reviews  found  that  the  new 
arrangements  were  largely  effective  at  coordinating  and  overseeing 
reconstruction  activity  and did  not  recommend  any  changes  to  either NPA. 
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for  future events.6 A second  review of each NPA  is  scheduled  for 2013, once 
further progress has been made on the reconstruction program. 
Audit objective, scope and criteria 
7. The  ANAO  is  undertaking  three  audits  of  key  aspects  of  the  NPAs 
signed with Queensland and Victoria  in relation  to natural disasters over  the 
2010–11 Australian spring and summer seasons. 
8. The objective of this audit was to assess the extent to which the disaster 
recovery  work  plans  for  Queensland  and  Victoria  were  prepared,  and 
appropriate  monitoring  reports  provided,  in  accordance  with  the  relevant 
NPA. 
9. The audit criteria were based on  the NPAs, which: outlined  the  three 
priority areas each work plan was to target; and required that they build on the 
planning  work  undertaken  by  Regional  Development  Australia  committees 
and local governments. The NPAs also required that the work plans identify a 
set  of  specific  reconstruction  projects,  and  that  each  state  provide  monthly 
reports  against  the  relevant  work  plan,  including  in  respect  to  progress  in 
meeting  the project milestones  and  outcomes  specified  in  the work plan  for 
their state. 
10. Separate  but  related  ANAO  performance  audits  are  also  underway, 
with the objective of assessing the effectiveness of the Inspectorate, supported 
by  the  Taskforce,  in  providing  assurance  that  value  for  money  is  being 
achieved  in  recovery  and  reconstruction  expenditure  in  Victoria  and 
Queensland. The report of the first audit, relating to value for money oversight 
in  respect  to Victorian  reconstruction projects,  is being  tabled  in  conjunction 
with  this  report. The  report  of  the  third  audit,  examining  the  Inspectorate’s 
value  for money oversight activities  in  respect  to Queensland  reconstruction 
projects, is expected to be tabled in the 2013 Budget sittings. 
Overall conclusion 
11. Given  their wide geographic  impact and  the high  level of damage  to 
public  assets,  the  natural  disasters  in  Queensland  and  Victoria  over  the 
2010–11 summer presented significant challenges  to  the Australian, state and 
local governments  to restore  infrastructure and services and provide support 
                                                 
6  See further at paragraph 2.19. 
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6  See further at paragraph 2.19. 
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to  affected  communities.  In  the  context  of  the  significant  Australian 
Government  contribution  to  the  cost  of  recovery  and  reconstruction  under 
NDRRA, new accountability and oversight measures were announced by  the 
Prime  Minister.  These  measures  were  given  effect  through  separate  NPAs 
signed  with  Queensland  and  Victoria.  Among  the  new  measures  was  a 
requirement  for  a  flood  recovery  work  plan  for  each  state  that  listed  the 
specific recovery and reconstruction projects that were being undertaken. 
12. The Taskforce is overseeing reconstruction in Queensland and Victoria 
worth more  than $7 billion  in relation  to  the natural disasters  in Queensland 




13. A work  plan  has  been  agreed with  each  state. The Queensland  plan 




recovery  projects  towards  which  NDRRA  funding  was  contributing.  The 
contents of the two plans differ significantly, but neither meets the requirement 
of the NPA that it identify a set of specific reconstruction projects. Accordingly, 
neither work  plan  has  provided  the  additional  oversight  and  accountability 
that had been envisaged. 
15. At the suggestion of the Taskforce, the one‐page Queensland work plan 
does  not  identify  any  specific  reconstruction  projects.7  The  Taskforce  also 
suggested  that  reliance could be placed on  the already developed state plan. 
However,  the  state  plan  titled  Operation  Queenslander:  The  State  Community 
Economic and Environmental Recovery and Reconstruction Plan 2011–2013 does not 
identify  specific  reconstruction  and  recovery  projects  (as  this  was  not  its 
purpose). Rather,  it  is  a  strategic, high‐level  framework  that  aligns  recovery 
efforts into six ‘lines of reconstruction’. 
16. It would have been difficult to complete a list of reconstruction projects 
during  the  early  stages  of  reconstruction.  The  approach  proposed  by  the 
                                                 
7  See further at paragraph 2.21. 
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7  See further at paragraph 2.21. 
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Taskforce was that  it would be sufficient for  ‘high  level descriptions of work’ 
to  be  provided  initially  in  the  work  plan  with  ‘further  details  added 
progressively’.8 However, the work plan for Queensland has not been updated 
as  project  details  have  become  available.  Some  project  level  information  is 
provided  by  Queensland  to  the  Taskforce  both  for  the  purpose  of  the 
Inspectorate  selecting projects  for  value  for money  reviews,  and  in monthly 
reporting  prepared  for  the  QRA  board.  However,  this  data  has  not  been 
updated  into  the work plan  (as  the Taskforce had originally proposed  to do) 
and the project level data has remained dispersed rather than being collated to 
include all metrics referred  to  in  the NPA. As a result, neither source of data 
provides the full range of project information referred to in the NPA, for both 
state  and  council‐delivered  projects.  Accordingly,  through  this  data  it  is 
difficult to measure the progress of the projects making up the reconstruction 
program  against  the  work  plan  and  in  meeting  project  milestones  and 
outcomes (as required by the NPA). 
17. The Victorian work plan is more substantial than the Queensland plan. 
It  identifies  41  reconstruction  initiatives  costed  at  $1.02 billion. However,  in 
many  instances,  the  work  plan  simply  identifies  broad  categories  of  work 
rather  than  specific  reconstruction  projects9,  and  therefore  is  also  not  fully 
consistent  with  the  relevant  NPA.  In  November  2012,  Victoria  advised  the 
ANAO that:  it agreed that the work plan did not provide specific detail as to 
which  roads  or  sections  of  the  regional  rail  network  required  work;  these 
details are held by LGAs and/or relevant state departments; but the Taskforce 
did not seek this information from Victoria. 
18. In  this  context,  in  November  2012,  Regional  Australia  advised  the 
ANAO  that  ‘as  the  new  oversight  and  governance  arrangements  were 
implemented,  it became clear  that  the specific  requirements of  the NPAs did 
not  necessarily  reflect  the  practicalities  of  rolling  out  the  reconstruction 
programs’. However,  this  issue was  not  raised  in  the  reviews  of  each NPA 
                                                 
8  Similarly, the 2012 review of the Queensland NPA observed that a work plan ‘may need to be a living 
document where further detail, such as project level information, is added as it becomes available so as 
to meet the project monitoring and reporting requirements of the NPA and ensure value for money’. 
9  For example, one initiative is $121.5 million for repair of flood damage to arterial roads, with the arterial 
roads involved not identified or even the number of roads requiring repairs. 
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undertaken  in  2012.10  Regional  Australia  also  has  not  provided  advice  to 
Ministers  on  this  matter,  and  there  have  been  no  recommendations  put 
forward  by  the  department  that  the  NPAs  be  amended  in  respect  to  the 
requirement for a work plan to identify specific reconstruction projects. 
19. The  Taskforce’s  development  and  administration  of  reporting 
arrangements has also not been to a sufficiently high standard. There was early 
recognition  that  Australian  Government  oversight  of  the  recovery  and 
reconstruction  efforts  in Queensland  and Victoria was  reliant  on  timely  and 
high quality data. However,  the Taskforce relied on  the data  it received  from 
the states even where this data did not provide the information required by the 
NPAs. Of note was  that,  since  the project  level  information  contained  in  the 
work  plans  was  limited,  monthly  reporting  has  not  provided  for  adequate 
oversight  of  whether  project  milestones  and  outcomes  are  being  met 
(a key matter that each NPA required to be addressed by the monthly reports). 
There  is also  limited evidence of the Taskforce analysing the  information that 
has  been  reported  by  the  states  or  raising  questions  about:  omitted data  (in 





Taskforce  was  developing  its  approach  for  undertaking  value  for  money 
reviews of individual reconstruction projects. Conducting these reviews is the 
primary  component  of  the  approach  adopted  by  the  Inspectorate  and  the 
Taskforce  to  provide  assurance  that  value  for  money  is  being  achieved  in 
recovery  and  reconstruction  expenditure  in  those  two  states.  In  this  context, 
the work of the Taskforce was more focused on supporting the Inspectorate in 
the  development  and  implementation  of  a  framework  to  conduct  value  for 
money  reviews  of  Queensland  reconstruction  projects.  As  noted  at 
paragraph 10,  the  ANAO  is  undertaking  separate  but  related  audits  of  the 
conduct  of  the  value  for  money  assurance  activities  in  Queensland  and 
Victoria. 
                                                 
10  In 2012, the Taskforce and the relevant state body undertook reviews of the Queensland and Victorian 
NPAs. The reviews found that the new arrangements were largely effective at coordinating and 
overseeing reconstruction activity and did not recommend any changes to either NPA. Nevertheless, the 
review of the Victorian NPA noted some areas relating to Commonwealth-state collaboration in 
emergency recovery that would benefit from further consideration between the Australian Government 
and the states for future events (see further at paragraph 2.19). 
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10  In 2012, the Taskforce and the relevant state body undertook reviews of the Queensland and Victorian 
NPAs. The reviews found that the new arrangements were largely effective at coordinating and 
overseeing reconstruction activity and did not recommend any changes to either NPA. Nevertheless, the 
review of the Victorian NPA noted some areas relating to Commonwealth-state collaboration in 
emergency recovery that would benefit from further consideration between the Australian Government 
and the states for future events (see further at paragraph 2.19). 
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21. The  ANAO  has  made  two  recommendations  in  respect  to  the 
preparation  and  delivery  of  the  recovery  work  plans  for  Queensland  and 
Victoria,  which  were  components  of  new  accountability  and  oversight 
measures  announced by  the Prime Minister  and  agreed  to by  the  respective 
state  governments.  The  first  recommendation  is  focused  on  obtaining  the 
project  level  information on  the  respective  reconstruction programs  that was 
required by the respective NPAs to be included in each work plan. The second 
recommendation  relates  to  improving data  collection, analysis and  reporting 
arrangements  of  reconstruction  progress.  This  audit  also  provides  a  useful 
reminder to Commonwealth officials that measures agreed to by governments 
are  expected  to  be  implemented  unless,  in  light  of  new  information  or 
circumstances, Ministers decide otherwise. 
Key findings by Chapter 
The Work Plans (Chapter 2) 
22. The Queensland work plan was developed  through  five drafts over a 
period  of  five  months,  between  February  and  June  2011.  The  plan  was 
forwarded  to  the office of  the Australian Government Minister Assisting  the 
Attorney‐General  on  Queensland  Floods  Recovery  for  agreement  in  early 
July 2011. The Minister was advised that the purpose of the work plan was to 
identify  specific projects  to assist with  reconstruction and/or  recovery but he 
was  not  provided  with  any  advice  as  to  whether  the  work  plan  met  the 
requirements  of  the  NPA.  The  Minister  approved  the  work  plan  on 
26 August 2011. 
23. The Queensland work plan is a one‐page document, with an additional 
one‐page  spreadsheet  attachment  that  outlines  the  format  of  the  monthly 
progress  reports  to be submitted by  the state. The key  role of  the work plan 
was  to  identify  the  reconstruction  and  recovery  projects  towards  which 
NDRRA funding was contributing. However, in developing the work plan, the 
Taskforce  suggested  to QRA  that,  rather  than  identifying  specific projects,  it 
would be sufficient for ‘high level descriptions of work’ to be provided initially 
with  ‘further details added progressively as matters develop’. The Taskforce 
further  proposed  that,  rather  than  developing  a  work  plan  specific  to  the 
Commonwealth’s needs,  reliance be placed on public documentation already 
developed  by  the  state  (although  the  state  planning  document  does  not 
identify  specific projects,  as  that was not  its purpose). The  result  is  that  the 
work plan does not identify a list of specific projects. 
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24. Rather  than progressively updating  the work plan as  it had originally 
proposed,  the  Taskforce  has  obtained  some  information  on  reconstruction 
projects  through other means, but  this  information has not  fully satisfied  the 
requirements  of  the  NPA.  In  particular,  some  data  on  approved  projects  is 
provided to the Taskforce to inform its sampling of Queensland reconstruction 
projects for the Inspectorate’s value for money reviews. In addition, since mid‐




Drafts were  exchanged  between Victorian  representatives  and  the Taskforce 
over  the  period  June  to  September  2011  before  the Victorian  flood  recovery 
work plan was agreed to by the Australian Government Minister for Regional 
Australia,  Regional  Development  and  Local  Government  on 
16 December 2011. 
26. The finalised Victorian flood recovery work plan  is a more substantial 
document  than  that  developed  for  Queensland.  The  work  plan  includes  an 
appendix  that  listed 41 proposed  reconstruction and  recovery  ‘initiatives’  for 
which  the  Victorian  Government  requested  Commonwealth  funding.  The 
work  plan  costed  these  initiatives  at  some  $1.02  billion,  comprising 
$827.2 million  in  gross  expenditure,  $122.5  million  in  insurance  offsets  and 




NPA  also  required  that  the  Victorian  work  plan  outline  project  plans  and 
strategies for projects over $5 million. In total, 21 of the 41 initiatives listed in 
the  appendix  to  the  work  plan  were  costed  at  greater  than  $5  million 
(recognising that an ‘initiative’ may comprise a number of projects). However, 
for none of  these  initiatives did  the work plan outline  the project plans  and 
strategies that the state proposed to adopt, meaning the NPA requirement was 
not  met.  This  impacted  on  the  Inspectorate’s  ability  to  be  satisfied  that  the 
proposed plans and strategies were likely to deliver value for money.11 
                                                 
11  The Inspectorate’s terms of reference included reviewing contractual frameworks, tendering processes 
and project management systems. 
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Reporting on Work Plan Delivery (Chapter 3) 
28. The Taskforce’s  terms of reference required  it  to provide  the National 
Disaster  Recovery  Committee  of  Cabinet  with  monthly  progress  reports  on 
progress with recovery and reconstruction, as well as updated estimates of the 
Australian Government’s  liability under NDRRA.12  In  this context, each NPA 






30. The Taskforce does not obtain reports  from Queensland  that meet  the 
requirements of the NPA. Rather, the Taskforce has relied on monthly reports 
prepared by QRA for the state’s purposes. More recent reports have included 
data  relating  to  natural  disasters  that  occurred  both  before  and  after  the 
timeframe  covered  by  the  NPA  but  this  was  also  not  addressed  by  the 
Taskforce. Over the first few months of 2012–13, QRA has been progressively 
separating  the disaster events  in  its  reporting but up  to  the date  this ANAO 
report was prepared this was only for selective metrics or at a high level. 
31. A key matter that each NPA required to be addressed by the monthly 




the value  of  each  such project.  Similar data has not been  reported  for  those 
projects being delivered by  state agencies.  In addition, QRA  reporting of  the 
value  of  projects  completed  includes  works  in  progress.  There  is  limited 
evidence of the Taskforce analysing the information that has been reported to 
it by Queensland.  Such  analysis  could usefully have  focused on  trends,  and 
would  beneficially  have  also  drawn  attention  to  the  lack  of  project‐specific 
reporting  in respect to state delivery agencies and  lack of clarity surrounding 
progress towards actual completion of the state reconstruction program. 
                                                 
12  See further at paragraph 3.1. 
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32. Victoria  has  also  consistently  provided  monthly  reports  to  the 
Taskforce. These  reports were broadly consistent with  the  terms of  the NPA. 
They included progress made with the initiatives contained in the work plan, 
together  with  updated  expenditure  reports.  However,  as  noted  at 
paragraph 26, a high proportion of  the  ‘initiatives’  listed  in  the work plan do 
not  identify specific reconstruction and recovery projects.  In addition, similar 
to  the  situation with  the  reports  from Queensland,  there  is no  evidence  that 
this data was analysed by the Taskforce in a systematic way. The reports also 
did  not  include  progress  against  the  recovery  plans  of  the  communities  in 
Victoria  that  had  been  identified  as  being  the  most  severely  flood‐affected 
(as required by the NPA to be included in the work plan and monthly reports). 
33. Transparency  and  accountability  was  also  less  than  originally 
envisaged, because of the inclusion by Victoria of recovery and reconstruction 
activities  originating  from  events  that  either  pre‐dated  or  post‐dated  the 
disaster events specified in the NPA. Ideally, these activities should have been 
separated. Although Queensland has commenced  this process, at  the  time of 
preparation  of  this  audit  report,  there  had  been  no  similar  move  in  this 
direction  in  relation  to  the  Victorian  flood  progress  reporting.  In  late‐
January 2013,  Regional  Australia  advised  the  ANAO  that  it  agrees  that  the 
work plan could be amended to exclude initiatives not related to the early 2011 
flooding and  that discussions with Victorian officials  in  relation  to  this have 
taken place. However, the department did not advise of the outcome of those 
discussions in relation to the work plan, nor whether the events covered by the 
NPA would be separately disclosed  in  future  in  the Victorian  flood progress 
reports. 
Agency responses 
34. The  proposed  audit  report  was  provided  to  Regional  Australia,  the 
Chair of the Inspectorate, the Attorney‐General’s Department, the Department 
of  Finance  and  Deregulation,  the  Department  of  the  Prime  Minister  and 
Cabinet,  the  Department  of  the  Treasury,  the  Victorian  Senior  Officials 
Coordination Group and  the Queensland Reconstruction Authority. Regional 
Australia,  the  Victorian  Senior  Officials  Coordination  Group  and  the 
Queensland  Reconstruction  Authority  provided  formal  comments  on  the 
proposed  report. These  are  included  at Appendix 1.  PM&C  also  provided  a 
departmental response on the recommendations. 
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NPA would be separately disclosed  in  future  in  the Victorian  flood progress 
reports. 
Agency responses 
34. The  proposed  audit  report  was  provided  to  Regional  Australia,  the 
Chair of the Inspectorate, the Attorney‐General’s Department, the Department 
of  Finance  and  Deregulation,  the  Department  of  the  Prime  Minister  and 
Cabinet,  the  Department  of  the  Treasury,  the  Victorian  Senior  Officials 
Coordination Group and  the Queensland Reconstruction Authority. Regional 
Australia,  the  Victorian  Senior  Officials  Coordination  Group  and  the 
Queensland  Reconstruction  Authority  provided  formal  comments  on  the 
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Set  out  below  are  the  ANAO’s  recommendations  and  the  responding  agencies’ 





The  ANAO  recommends  that  the  Department  of 
Regional Australia, Local Government, Arts  and  Sport, 
in  preparation  for  the  forthcoming  reviews  of  the 
National  Partnership  Agreements,  identify  the  most 
effective means of obtaining the project level information 
on  the  respective  reconstruction  programs  required  by 







The  ANAO  recommends  that  the  Department  of 
Regional  Australia,  Local  Government,  Arts  and  Sport 
improve  its  monitoring  of  the  delivery  of  the  Natural 
Disaster  Recovery  Work  Plans  for  Queensland  and 
Victoria by: 
(a) seeking from each state the project level data that 
is  required  to  report  to  Ministers  on 
reconstruction  progress  in  the  manner  required 
by  each National  Partnership Agreement  (or  as 
may otherwise be agreed); and 
(b) undertaking  analysis  of  relevant  data  that  has 
been reported by each state over time to identify 
significant  trends  and  other  matters  of 
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providing  financial  assistance  in  response  to  natural  disasters,  and  outlines  the 
additional  oversight  and  accountability  mechanisms  introduced  for  the  significant 




1.1 Prime responsibility  for  the response  to a disaster rests with state and 
territory governments. Nevertheless, as natural disasters often result  in  large‐
scale  expenditure  by  state  governments  in  the  form  of  disaster  relief  and 
recovery  payments  and  infrastructure  restoration,  the  Commonwealth  has 
established arrangements to provide financial assistance to the states in certain 
circumstances. 
1.2 The  key  national mechanism  for providing  financial  assistance  is  the 




be  provided  through  NDRRA  if  the  relevant  Minister  is  satisfied  that 
exceptional  circumstances  exist.  States  are  required  to  provide  audited 
financial  statements  to acquit expenditure,  including expenditure of advance 
payments, and repay to the Commonwealth amounts not properly spent. 
1.3 The determination defines  those natural disasters  that are covered by 
NDRRA, and  identifies  those measures  that are eligible  for NDRRA  funding. 
Subject  to administrative rules set out  in  the determination, upon notification 
of the natural disaster to the Commonwealth Attorney‐General by the affected 
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 Category  C  —  community  recovery  (for  community  facilities)  and 
clean‐up  and  recovery  grants  for  small  businesses  and  primary 
producers; and 
 Category D — exceptional circumstances assistance. 
1.4 In  November  2012,  the  Department  of  Regional  Australia,  Local 
Government, Arts and Sport (Regional Australia) provided the ANAO with its 
perspective  on  the  operation  of  NDRRA,  by  way  of  background  to  the 
introduction of additional oversight and accountability measures  in  response 
to  the  2010–11  flooding  in  Queensland  and  Victoria.  Specifically,  Regional 
Australia advised that: 




reconstruction  as  it  occurs.  Limited  Commonwealth  oversight  at  the 
conclusion of reconstruction is afforded by audited claims submitted by states 
and territories. No project level information is provided in these claims. 
Additional oversight and accountability measures 
1.5 The  eastern  states  were  subject  to  widespread  flooding  during  the 
2010–11  Australian  spring  and  summer  seasons,  and  Queensland  was  also 
impacted by Tropical Cyclones (TC) Tasha, Anthony and Yasi. In this context, 
on 27 January 2011, the Prime Minister announced that preliminary estimates13, 




rebuilding  could  start  as  soon  as  possible,  and  to  provide  certainty  to  the 
Queensland  Government  and  local  authorities,  the  Australian  Government 
had agreed to make an advance payment of $2 billion to Queensland. 
1.6 Subsequently, on 7 February 2011  the Prime Minister announced new 
oversight  and  accountability measures  to  ensure  value  for money would  be 
obtained  in  the  rebuilding  of  flood‐affected  regions.  Accordingly,  under 
                                                 
13  Excluding the effects of Tropical Cyclone Yasi, which reached the mainland in the early hours of 
3 February 2011. 
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National  Partnership  Agreements  (NPAs)  signed  with  the  Queensland  and 
Victorian state governments in February and May 2011 respectively: 
 a  recovery  work  plan  was  required  to  be  developed  by  each  state, 
outlining a set of projects to assist with reconstruction and/or recovery, 
with each work plan  to be agreed between  the  relevant  state and  the 
Australian Government; and 
 the  Australian  Government  Reconstruction  Inspectorate  was 
established  with  the  objective  of  providing  assurance  that  value  for 
money  was  received  in  the  recovery  effort.  The  Inspectorate  is  to 
perform its functions by:14 
 working collaboratively with any reconstruction agency on  the 
development  of  contractual  frameworks,  tendering  processes 
and project management systems used; 
 where  necessary,  undertaking  scrutiny  of  requests  for 
reimbursement  by  local  government  for  completed 
reconstruction projects; 
 undertaking  scrutiny  of  contracts  and  benchmark  prices,  to 
ensure value for money; 
 undertaking  scrutiny  prior  to  execution  for  complex  or  high 
value contracts; 
 monitoring achievement against agreed milestones; and 




arrangements. They are also  in addition  to  the establishment of a Secretaries’ 
Steering  Committee  and  the  National  Disaster  Recovery  Cabinet  Sub‐
Committee,  the appointment of  the Minister Assisting on Queensland Floods 
Recovery  and,  for  Victoria,  the  Minister  for  Regional  Australia,  Regional 
Development and Local Government being given an oversight role  in respect 
of  recovery. Further, Queensland  established  the Queensland Reconstruction 
Authority  (with  two Commonwealth appointments  to  its board).  In Victoria, 
                                                 
14  As set out in the Inspectorate’s terms of reference, which were also reflected in the Queensland NPA. 
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14  As set out in the Inspectorate’s terms of reference, which were also reflected in the Queensland NPA. 
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the  state  established  the  Secretaries’  Flood  Recovery  Group  and  the  Senior 
Officials’  Coordination  Group  (with  one  Commonwealth  member  on  the 
latter).  
1.8 Advance payments of $2 billion  for Queensland and $500 million  for 
Victoria  were  made  after  finalisation  of  the  respective  NPAs.  NDRRA 
continues  to  apply  to  those  natural  disasters  covered  by  the  NPAs,  with 
payments to the states made (through the Department of the Treasury) by the 
Attorney  General’s  Department  (which  administers  NDRRA).  The  stated 
intention  of  each  NPA  was  to  strengthen  and  complement  the  NDRRA 
governance and accountability provisions. 
1.9 The Reconstruction Inspectorate  is supported by the National Disaster 
Recovery  Taskforce  located  within  Regional  Australia.  The  Taskforce  is 
responsible  for  Commonwealth  engagement  with  the  Queensland  and 
Victorian reconstruction agencies during the recovery phase and is responsible 
for  the  implementation of  the additional oversight requirements contained  in 
the NPAs.15  It was  also  the  lead Australian Government  agency  in  terms  of 




 reporting  to  relevant  Ministers  and  providing  the  National  Disaster 
Recovery  Cabinet  Sub‐Committee  with  monthly  progress  reports  on 
state  plans  for  recovery,  including  updated  estimates  of  the 
Commonwealth’s liability under NDRRA; 
 assessing spending on recovery and reconstruction efforts arising from 
the  flooding  and  cyclone  events  so  as  to  ensure  consistency  with 
NDRRA; 
 assessing  requests  for  Commonwealth  funding  assistance  outside  of 
those automatically triggered by a NDRRA declaration; and 
 ensuring  that  a  strategic  approach  is  taken  to  reconstruction  and 
recovery efforts. 
                                                 
15  Initially, the Taskforce was funded to operate until the end of 2012. The May 2012 Budget included 
additional funding to extend the operation of the Taskforce by one year. This was in response to the 
increased time granted to the Queensland Government for the completion of reconstruction projects. 
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Audit objective, scope and criteria 
1.11 The  ANAO  is  undertaking  three  audits  of  key  aspects  of  the  NPAs 
signed with Queensland and Victoria  in relation  to natural disasters over  the 
2010–11 Australian spring and summer seasons. 
1.12 The objective of this audit was to assess the extent to which the disaster 
recovery  work  plans  for  Queensland  and  Victoria  were  prepared,  and 
appropriate  monitoring  reports  provided,  in  accordance  with  the  relevant 
NPA. 
1.13 Separate  but  related  ANAO  performance  audits  are  also  underway, 
with the objective of assessing the effectiveness of the Inspectorate, supported 
by  the  Taskforce,  in  providing  assurance  that  value  for  money  is  being 
achieved  in  recovery  and  reconstruction  expenditure  in  Victoria  and 
Queensland. The report of the first audit, relating to value for money oversight 
in  respect  to Victorian  reconstruction projects,  is being  tabled  in  conjunction 
with  this  report. The  report  of  the  third  audit,  examining  the  Inspectorate’s 
value  for money oversight activities  in  respect  to Queensland  reconstruction 
projects, is expected to be tabled in the 2013 Budget sittings.  
1.14 These  audits  focus  on  the  performance  of  the  relevant  Australian 
Government entities in discharging their responsibilities following agreements 
reached with  the Queensland  and Victorian Governments  by  the Australian 
Government. 
Audit scope and criteria 
1.15 The audit focused on the development and approval of the work plans 
for Queensland and Victoria. It also included examination of state monitoring 
and  reporting  (to  the Australian Government) of delivery against  the agreed 
work plans. 
1.16 The audit criteria were based on  the NPAs, which: outlined  the  three 
priority areas each work plan was to target; and required that they build on the 
planning  work  undertaken  by  Regional  Development  Australia  committees 
and  local governments (so as to ensure a strategic approach to reconstruction 
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 the  Queensland  NPA  required  that  the  work  plan  for  that  state  be 
developed  consistently  with  principles  outlined  in  a  schedule  to  the 
NPA  (including various requirements as  to  the  information needed  to 
support proposals). 





Structure of the report 
Chapter title Chapter overview 
2. The Work Plans 
Examines the development of the work plans 
and assesses the extent to which the plans 
comply with the terms set out in the NPAs. 
3. Reporting on Work Plan Delivery 
Examines the Taskforce’s role in state 
monitoring and reporting of delivery against 
the work plans. 
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2. The Work Plans 
This  chapter  examines  the development  of  the work plans  and  assesses  the  extent  to 
which  the  plans  complied  with  the  terms  set  out  in  the  National  Partnership 
Agreements. 
Introduction 
2.1 Through  the Queensland NPA,  the  state  agreed  to prepare  a  natural 
disaster  recovery work plan which  ‘will  identify  a  set  of  specific projects  to 
assist  with  reconstruction  and/or  recovery’.  The  NPA  defined  a  natural 
disaster recovery work plan as: 
The  collection  of  projects  developed  by  the  states,  and  agreed  with  the 
Commonwealth, for the reconstruction and/or recovery following the 2010–11 
floods and Cyclone Yasi. 
2.2 Similarly,  the  Victorian  NPA  required  that  state  to  develop  a  flood 
recovery work plan that would: provide information on Victorian procurement  
policies; outline a set of projects to assist with reconstruction and/or recovery; 
and  outline  project  plans  and  strategies  for  projects  over  $5 million.  The 
Victorian NPA  included a similar definition of work plan as  that adopted  in 
the Queensland NPA, as follows: 
The  collection  of major  projects developed  by Victoria  and  agreed with  the 
Commonwealth,  for  reconstruction  and/or  recovery  following  the 
2011 Victorian floods. 
2.3 The Queensland and Victorian  flood NPAs each  indicate  that projects 
included  in  the work plans would  target  three priority areas  to assist  in  the 
reconstruction process. The priority areas are: 
 reconstruction:  supporting  communities  to  rebuild  major  essential 
public assets; 
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The Work Plans 
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account  the  overall  environment  in  which  the  recovery  and  reconstruction 
assistance  was  designed  and  operated.  In  particular,  the  ANAO’s  analysis 
recognised  that  the  Taskforce  faced  a  difficult  task  because  of  the  range  of 
divergent perspectives of  the various Australian,  state and  local government 
entities involved in the recovery and reconstruction processes. 
Earlier adoption of the work plan approach 
2.6 The first occasion that a NPA and a natural disaster recovery work plan 
were used in respect to NDRRA funding was in the aftermath of the Victorian 




Projects  within  the  plan  were  funded  by:  the  Australian  and  Victorian 
Governments ($117 million); the Victorian Bushfire Appeal Fund ($56 million); 
and  corporate,  community  and philanthropic donors  ($20 million). The plan 
stated that it was based on the disaster recovery framework being used by the 
Victorian  Bushfire  Reconstruction  and  Recovery  Authority  to  guide  its 




that  it  would  fund  a  range  of  these  projects,  focusing  on  those  that  were 
expected  to  contribute  to  the  economic  and  social  recovery  of  communities 
following  the  bushfires.  Particular  projects were  highlighted  throughout  the 
document, together with a section that identified each project by location. 
2.9 The  Commonwealth  provided  funding  to  Victoria  to  implement 
selected  measures  from  the  state  plan,  under  the  terms  of  the  NPA  on  the 
Victorian  Bushfire  Reconstruction  and  Recovery.  The  NPA  was  signed  in 
March 2010, thirteen months after the bushfires. The NPA scope related to the 
bushfires that occurred after 29 January and until 28 February 2009. 
2.10 Through  the  bushfires  NPA,  the  Australian  Government  agreed  to 
provide $31.1 million to Victoria. This funding was in addition to the assistance 
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in  respect  to  the  2010–11  flooding  was  not  intended  to  increase  Australian 




2.11 The  Victorian  Bushfire  Recovery  NPA  incorporated  clearly  defined 
projects from the Rebuilding Together Plan, listing those that were to be funded 
by  the Commonwealth and  the manner  in which  funds were  to be allocated. 
The agreed  total provided by  the Commonwealth was  for 25 initiatives, over 




responsible  for coordinating a whole‐of‐government  response,  in partnership 
with  the  Victorian  Government,  to  the  Victorian  bushfire  tragedy.  She  also 
chaired the Commonwealth Victorian Bushfire Inter‐Departmental Committee. 
Further  in  this  respect,  Regional  Australia  advised  the  ANAO  in 
November 2012 that: 
The Commonwealth had recent experience assisting Victoria  to recover  from 
the  2009  bushfires  and  this  informed  the  creation  of  the  Queensland  NPA. 
However,  there  are  considerable  differences  between  the  acute  and 
conspicuous  damage  caused  by  a  bushfire  and  the  widespread  and  often 
concealed damage caused by flooding. Damage levels from flooding remain as 
estimates until well into the reconstruction program, when more accurate data 
becomes available. Unsurprisingly,  this has  resulted  in  the Commonwealth’s 
estimated exposure to reconstruction costs varying over time. 
                                                 
16  Specifically, clause 5 of the bushfires NPA stated: ‘The primary mechanism for the Commonwealth to 
support the States and Territories following a natural disaster is through the NDRRA. This agreement will 
cover projects that are not funded under the NDRRA.’ 
17  The NPA provided that the Minister for Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs 
was authorised to agree or amend schedules to the Agreement, and certify that payment may be made 
to Victoria. In addition, the Government appointed the Hon Bill Shorten MP as Parliamentary Secretary 
for Victorian Bushfire Reconstruction. 
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The Queensland work plan 
2.13 The Queensland work plan was developed  through  five drafts over a 
period  of  five  months,  between  February  and  June  2011.  The  plan  was 
forwarded  to  the  office  of  the  Minister  Assisting  the  Attorney‐General  on 
Queensland Floods Recovery  for  agreement  in  early  July  2011. The Minister 
was advised that the purpose of the work plan was to identify specific projects 
to assist with reconstruction and/or recovery but he was not provided with any 
advice  as  to  whether  the  work  plan  met  the  requirements  of  the  NPA. 
The Minister approved the work plan on 26 August 2011. 
2.14 The Queensland work plan is a one‐page document, with an additional 
one‐page  spreadsheet  attachment  that  outlines  the  format  of  the  monthly 
progress reports to be submitted by the state. As illustrated in Appendix 2, the 
work plan comprises nine clauses, under three headings as follows: 
 the  first heading  (‘Work Plan’)  covers  a  single  clause  referring  to  the 
obligation under the NPA for a work plan to be prepared; 
 the  second heading  (‘Content of Work Plan’)  comprises  three  clauses 
that  reflect  and  summarises  various  statements  made  in  the  NPA 
concerning the content of the work plan; and 
 the  third  heading  (‘Reporting’)  comprises  five  clauses  outlining  the 
requirement for reporting on a monthly basis in the format of the one‐
page attachment, and  that  the work plan and reporting  template may 
be  amended  to  reflect  changing  circumstances  and  provides  for  the 
Commonwealth to request in writing: 
 additional data and reporting; and/or 




The Queensland work plan  comprises  the  one‐page document,  the monthly 
progress reporting and the Queensland State Plan (Operation Queenslander). 
The Queensland and Commonwealth Governments agreed that the State Plan 
was  intended  to  accompany  the  work  plan  as  it  guides  reconstruction  and 
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2.16 Similar  to  the work plan,  the state plan does not  include project  level 
information. Some project level information is provided by Queensland to the 
Taskforce both for the purpose of the Inspectorate selecting projects for value 
for money  reviews,  and  in monthly  reporting  prepared  for  the QRA  board. 
However, this data has not been updated into the work plan (as the Taskforce 
had  originally  proposed  to  do)  and  the  project  level  data  has  remained 
dispersed  rather  than being  collated  to  include  all metrics  referred  to  in  the 
NPA.  As  a  result,  neither  source  of  data  provides  the  full  range  of  project 
information  referred  to  in  the  NPA,  for  both  state  and  council‐delivered 
projects. Accordingly,  through  this data  it  is difficult  to measure progress of 
the projects making up the reconstruction program against the work plan and 
in meeting project milestones and outcomes (as required by the NPA). 
Practicality of the NPA requirement 
2.17 The key  role of  the work plan was  to  identify  the  reconstruction and 









As  the  new  oversight  and  governance  arrangements  were  implemented,  it 
became  clear  that  the  specific  requirements of  the NPAs did not necessarily 
reflect  the  practicalities  of  rolling  out  the  reconstruction  programs. 
For example, the NPAs required that the work plans  identify a set of specific 
projects  to  assist  with  reconstruction  and/or  recovery  in  each  state. 
In Queensland alone, over 1500 projects have been  identified  to date by  local 
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reflect  the  practicalities  of  rolling  out  the  reconstruction  programs. 
For example, the NPAs required that the work plans  identify a set of specific 
projects  to  assist  with  reconstruction  and/or  recovery  in  each  state. 
In Queensland alone, over 1500 projects have been  identified  to date by  local 
councils  and  state  agencies,  and  as  recently  as  a  month  ago,  new  project 
applications were still being submitted. It is inconceivable that such a list could 
have been compiled in a timeframe to be included in a work plan. More to the 
The Work Plans 
 
ANAO Audit Report No.24 2012–13 
The Preparation and Delivery of the Natural Disaster Recovery Work Plans for Queensland and Victoria 
 
35 
point,  the  establishment  of  such  a  list  would  not  have  augmented  the 
Commonwealth’s oversight of reconstruction in any practical sense.18 
2.19 In  2012,  the  Taskforce  and  the  relevant  state  body  (QRA  and 
representatives of the Victorian Secretaries’ Flood Recovery Group) undertook 
reviews of  the Queensland and Victorian NPAs. The  reviews  found  that  the 
new  arrangements  were  largely  effective  at  coordinating  and  overseeing 
reconstruction activity and did not  recommend any changes  to either NPA.19 
Nevertheless,  the  review  of  the Victorian NPA noted  some  areas  relating  to 
Commonwealth‐state collaboration  in emergency recovery  that would benefit 
from further consideration between the Australian Government and the states 








 a work plan  ‘may need  to be a  living document where  further detail, 
such  as project  level  information,  is  added  as  it becomes  available  to 
                                                 
18  Regional Australia further commented that: ‘It was inevitable that the applications in support of the 
original (and very speculative) damage estimates would be slow coming in. There were also brand new 
application processes that had to be understood and complied with by LGAs. The Queensland 
Reconstruction Authority said to LGAs early on that this should not stop them getting on with the work if 
they were confident that the claims would be honoured.’ 
19  A second review of each NPA is scheduled for 2013, once further progress has been made on the 
reconstruction program. 
20  The review suggested that the following items should be considered for discussion and clarification: 
 the appropriate cost threshold and methodology for value for money assessments; 
 the scale-of-event threshold to initiate a NPA for joint Commonwealth-state recovery and 
reconstruction actions; 
 the appropriate types of performance monitoring and reporting in line with different scales-of-
events taking into account consideration of accountability and transparency objectives together 
with the relative governance and cost burdens; 
 principles and guidelines pertaining to the use of and the threshold scale-of-event for advances to 
the states of Commonwealth funding; and 
 clarification of the process and responsibilities for determining eligibility of reconstruction and 
recovery initiatives for NDRRA funding, should a NPA be put in place. 
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meet  the  project monitoring  and  reporting  requirements  of  the NPA 
and ensure value for money.’ 
Identifying specific projects 
2.20 Against  this background,  in developing  the work plan,  the Taskforce 
suggested  to QRA  that,  rather  than  identifying  specific projects,  it would be 
sufficient  for  ‘high  level  descriptions  of work’  to  be  provided  initially with 
‘further details added progressively as matters develop’. The Taskforce further 




To  allow  consistency  between  the  State  Plan  and  the  requirements  for  the 
Work Plan under the NPA, it would be sufficient for Queensland to specify in 




It  was  due  to  the  anticipated  large  number  of  individual  reconstruction 
projects  and  the  difficulty  in  collating  this  information  in  a  meaningful 
timeframe  that  the Taskforce suggested  that  the Queensland work plan need 
not  identify  specific  projects,  but  rather  be  combined with  other  sources  to 
provide  the  Commonwealth  with  the  required  information.  The  work  plan 
does not therefore list all projects and indeed, even now, two years later, such 
a  list would still be evolving. The QRA advises  that  there will be more  than 
1,800 discrete reconstruction projects in Queensland. 
                                                 
21  The ‘State Plan’ is a separate public document prepared by the state titled Operation Queenslander: The 
State Community Economic and Environmental Recovery and Reconstruction Plan 2011–2013. The 
State Plan also does not identify specific reconstruction and recovery projects but, rather, is a strategic, 
high-level framework that aligns recovery efforts into six ‘lines of reconstruction’. The state also prepared 
an Implementation Plan (providing key statistics relating to recovery, such as damage estimates and a 
broad overview of the major tasks and deadlines for reconstruction) and a Local Plan Guide (providing a 
practical guide for Councils to develop their own local recovery plans). 
22  Specifically, on 11 April 2011, the Taskforce suggested to QRA that ‘although the NPA specified three 
target areas for priority projects, encompassing reconstruction, people and communities, and the 
economy, I note that Operation Queenslander: The State Community, Economic and Environmental 
Recovery and Reconstruction Plan 2011–2013 identifies six lines of reconstruction. To allow 
consistency, it would seem sufficient for Queensland to specify in the (Work) Plan high priority 
reconstruction projects under each of these six areas.’ In this context, in January 2012, during the 
planning of this performance audit, the Taskforce advised the ANAO that the State Plan ‘accompanies’ 
the Queensland work plan. 
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2.22 At  the  time  the  Queensland  floods  work  plan  was  provided  to  the 
responsible  Australian  Government  Minister  for  approval,  relatively  little 
project‐specific information had been received by QRA from councils and state 
delivery  agencies.  In  this  context,  on  24  February  2011,  QRA  sent  an 
information  request  to  affected  Local  Government  Authorities  (LGAs).  The 









and  local  government  infrastructure.  Of  particular  note  was  that  very  few 





the  work  plan  was  forwarded  by  the  Taskforce  to  the  relevant  Australian 
Government  Minister’s  office  for  agreement.  Specifically,  the  value  of 
applications  received  had  risen,  but  only  to  $443.3 million. Again,  relatively 
few  applications  had  been  received  from  SDAs,  with  the  majority  of  the 
applications  received  (by  number  and  value)  having  been  submitted  by 
LGAs.25 
2.25 It was not until after  the work plan was provided by  the Taskforce  to 
the  responsible  Minister  for  approval  (in  early  July  2011)  that  submissions 
                                                 
23  The details included in each submission provided to QRA for assessment included: the location of the 
works; a description of the works to be undertaken; data to support the cost estimate; as well as the 
planned project start and completion dates. 
24  In November 2012, QRA advised the ANAO that: ‘The estimate request sent to the LGAs was for an 
initial estimate of their total damage and a list of potential projects to assist with the development of the 
state damage estimate.’ 
25  In November 2012, Regional Australia commented that: ‘By July 2011, QRA had received 368 
submissions for individual reconstruction projects from local government authorities, which is quite 
significant considering the new approval processes that had to be developed by QRA and understood 
and complied with by local government authorities.’ 
  
ANAO Audit Report No.24 2012–13 
The Preparation and Delivery of the Natural Disaster Recovery Work Plans for Queensland and Victoria 
 
38 
representing  a  significant proportion of  the  expected  cost of natural disaster 
reconstruction and recovery began to be received by QRA. As it eventuated, it 
was  not  until  May  2012  that  the  value  of  submissions  received  exceeded 
$6 billion. 
2.26 In its February 2012 third report to the Prime Minister, the Inspectorate 
stated  that  it  had  ‘emphasised  strongly  to  QRA  its  expectation  that  all 
applications  for  funding  should  have  been  submitted  by  30  June  2012.’ 
However, this timeline was not met. Instead, as of August 2012, QRA reported 
that its forecast pipeline of works indicated that, based on current submission 
rates  and  processing,  it  expected  that  processing  of  all  submissions  for  the 
2010–11 events would be, as a minimum, in progress by October 2012.26 
2.27 By November 2012, QRA was reporting that nine LGAs and DTMR had 
indicated  that  they  have  outstanding  submissions  for  the  2010–11  events, 
totalling  $80.4  million  and  $135.7  million  respectively.  It  also  reported  that 
approximately  90  per  cent  of  the  submissions  received  by  QRA  had  been 
processed,  with  $1237.4  million  either  ‘Under  Assessment’  or  ‘Awaiting 




2.28 In  the  context  of  meeting  the  NPA  requirement  that  the  work  plan 
identify a set of specific projects to assist with reconstruction and/or recovery, 
the protracted process of  identifying projects could have been addressed  in a 
number  of  ways.  The  approach  that  the  Taskforce  had  proposed 
(see paragraph  2.20) was  that  ‘high  level  descriptions  of work’  be  provided 
initially  with  ‘further  details  added  progressively  as  matters  develop’. 
QRA did not record any disagreement with such an approach, but  it was not 
implemented by the Taskforce. Specifically: 
 the  work  plan  agreed  in  July  2011  did  not  include  high  level 
descriptions of work  in respect to project submissions received and/or 
approved  to  that  date. Although  the work  plan  referred  to  the  state 
                                                 
26  QRA had advised the Inspectorate in mid-February 2012 that it had written to all Queensland LGAs 
regarding the 30 June 2012 deadline for project application submissions. However, the advice did not 
indicate whether all SDAs had been similarly notified. 
27  However, there was no disaggregation provided on the number or value of unprocessed submissions 
that relate to the events covered by the NPA. 
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its  role  in  providing  assurance  that  value  for  money  is  being  achieved  in 
recovery and reconstruction expenditure29,  the Taskforce selects projects from 
this  list  using  a  Cumulative  Monetary  Amount30  sampling  technique  and 
requests the relevant project files from QRA. The Taskforce also selects projects 
by other means.31 A total of approximately 109 projects had been selected as at 
November  2012.  However,  as  indicated  above,  while  full  details  are  made 
available for selected projects, the Taskforce receives very limited information 
on  the  vast  majority  of  projects  submitted  to  and  approved  by  QRA 
(around 2550  projects).  Nevertheless,  this  data  might  have  proven  a  useful 
starting  point  for  the  development  and  periodic  updating  of  a  work  plan 
listing specific projects.  It was also within  the Taskforce’s purview  to request 
any  relevant  information  and  documentation  necessary  to  track  the  use  of 
NDRRA funding. 
2.30 Some  project‐specific  information  has  also  been  reported  to  the 
Taskforce  through monthly  reports prepared  by QRA  for  its  own purposes. 
Specifically, an appendix currently included in both the Chief Financial Officer 
report  and  the  Reconstruction  and  Governance  report  (see  further  at 
paragraphs  3.11  to  3.15)  included,  for  projects  being  delivered  by  LGAs, 
information  on  category  of  work  being  undertaken,  project  start  and 
completion  dates, whether  the  project  had  been  approved  by QRA  and  the 
extent to which physical work has been completed. At the time of preparation 
                                                 
28  Specifically: name of applicant; submission number; date approved; submission value; approved value; 
and values identified as: day labour; not eligible; or under investigation by QRA. 
29  As outlined at paragraph 1.13, the ANAO is conducting a separate performance audit of the Taskforce’s 
value for money work. 
30  Under Cumulative Monetary Amount sampling, the projects are listed in the order in which they were 
approved, a running total of the cumulative total value of the projects is maintained, and projects that 
cross a predetermined threshold are selected. 
31  Such as projects representing particular interest or risk to the Commonwealth, greater stratification of 
location or delivery agent, or identified through complaints. 
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of  this  ANAO  report,  the  information  being  reported  did  not  include  the 
project  value.  In  addition,  the  project‐specific  reporting  did  not  include 
reconstruction work  being delivered  by  state  agencies,  notwithstanding  that 










currently  provided  to  the  Commonwealth  monthly.32  Further  progress 
information on  specific  reconstruction projects  (including  those of DTMR)  is 
provided  to  the Commonwealth monthly  through  its  representatives  on  the 
QRA Board and through the QRA Reconstruction and Governance report. 
Given  this  level of  regular  reporting and access  to project  level  information, 
including  at  the  QRA  Board  level,  Regional  Australia  believed  that  the 
inclusion of this information in the work plan was an unnecessary duplication. 




2.32 As  indicated by Regional Australia,  some project  level  information  is 
provided by Queensland to the Taskforce in a number of different formats for 
purposes  other  than  work  plan  development  and  reporting.  The  list  of 
approved projects is provided for the purposes of selecting a sample of projects 
for  Inspectorate  value  for  money  reviews,  and  does  not  include  important 
project metrics such as milestones (as this  is not the purpose of that  list). The 
monthly  reports prepared  for  the QRA board also  include some project  level 
information. However, as outlined at paragraph 2.30, this reporting (prepared 
for the QRA board’s purposes rather than to meet NPA reporting obligations) 
does not  include  the project value and does not  include  reconstruction work 
being delivered by state agencies. In addition, progress reports for  individual 
                                                 
32  Information on DTMR projects was included for the first time in the December 2012 reports.  
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projects  are  only  able  to  be  obtained  by  the  Taskforce  in  respect  to  those 
projects  that have been  sampled  for a value  for money  review, and where a 
progress report has been submitted by the delivery agency to QRA, and then 
provided by QRA to the Taskforce. 
The Victorian work plan 
2.33 As noted at paragraph 2.2,  ‘natural disaster  recovery work plan’ was 




Victoria will develop  a  Flood Recovery Work Plan  in  consultation with  the 








A draft of  the Victorian work plan was provided at  the  June 2011 meeting of 
the Senior Officials Coordination Group (SOCG)33, and progress with the work 
plan was subsequently discussed.34 
2.35 When  the  Victorian  flood  recovery  work  plan  was  agreed  to  by  the 
Australian  Government  Minister  for  Regional  Australia,  Regional 
Development and Local Government on 16 December 2011, seven months had 
elapsed  from  the  finalisation  of  the  Victorian  NPA,35  and  11  months  had 
passed since the flood event. The finalised Victorian flood recovery work plan 
                                                 
33  The SOCG is composed of Commonwealth representatives from the Taskforce and EMA (Attorney-
General’s Department), and Victorian representatives from the Departments of: Primary Industries; 
Premier and Cabinet; Treasury and Finance; Human Services; and Health. It met monthly in 2011, but 
now meets bi-monthly. 
34  In November 2012, Regional Australia advised the ANAO that there were multiple drafts of the Victorian 
work plan considered at three SOCG meetings between June and September 2011. 
35  The National Partnership Agreement for Victorian Flood Reconstruction and Recovery was signed by the 
Premier of Victoria on 10 May 2011. 
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Coverage of the work plan 
2.36 Although clause 13 of the NPA required that a Victorian work plan be 
developed, clause 10(a) restricted the coverage of the work plan to the ‘floods 
for which NDRRA  assistance was  activated  in  early  2011’. Notwithstanding 
this  specific  requirement,  the  work  plan  produced  by  Victoria  was  titled 




2.37 In  this  regard,  the  Taskforce’s  brief  to  the  Minister  in  October  2011 
recommending that the work plan be signed noted that it included activities in 
relation  to  earlier  flood  events but also advised  that  it  ‘specifically  identifies 
those that relate to the events relevant to the NPA (January‐March 2011)’. The 
Victorian work plan provides high‐level estimates of funding initiatives for the 






 the  floods  caused  widespread  damage  to  local  roads,  numerous 
bridges,  footpaths and walking  tracks  (but no damage estimates were 
provided); and 
 the  Victorian  Department  of  Transport  identified  approximately 
$14.83 million  in  damage  to  parks,  recreation  sites,  roads,  tracks  and 
bridges as a result of the December 2010 floods. 
2.38 Given  the work plan was  required specifically  in  relation  to  the early 
2011  flooding  events,  there was  no  rationale  provided  in  the work  plan  for 
including  earlier  events  that  are  not  subject  to  coverage  under  the  NPA.36 
On this  basis,  to  provide  appropriate  transparency  and  accountability,  there 
                                                 
36  Other than to state that the 2011 events compounded the effects of the previous events. 
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36  Other than to state that the 2011 events compounded the effects of the previous events. 
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would  have  been  benefit  in  the  Taskforce  requesting  that  the  recovery 
initiatives  in  relation  to  the  early  2011 events  be  clearly  delineated  and 
separately costed. 
Information on Victorian procurement policies 
2.39 In  respect  to  the  NPA  requirement  that  the  work  plan  provide 
information  on  Victorian  procurement  policies,  the  document  includes  a 
discrete  section  titled  ‘procurement  management’.  This  two‐page  section 
outlines  the  role  of  the  Victorian  Government  Purchasing  Board  and  key 
procurement  requirements  under  the  state  procurement  framework.  It  also 
outlines  the  operation  of  ‘standard  procurement’  procedures  and  ‘critical 
incident procurement’ procedures. 
2.40 The  Purchasing  Board’s  policies  apply  to  Victorian  Government 
departments and a number of administrative offices but  they do not apply to 










ensuring value  for money  in  the  reconstruction projects undertaken by  local 
councils and state agencies’. The initial drafting proposed by the Taskforce (but 
later  amended  by  Victoria)  had  suggested  that  quality  assurance  processes 
were  in  place  that  involved  VicRoads  (for  local  council  roads)  and  the 
Department of Transport (for works undertaken by VicRail) assessing ‘whether 
the  tender  process  had  been  properly  carried  out,  that  the  works  meet 
appropriate standards and that the works are eligible under NDRRA’. No such 
advice was included in the Inspectorate’s fourth report, and the Taskforce did 
                                                 
37  However, the work plan has not been updated to include the information obtained on LGAs. 
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not  otherwise  seek  to  establish  how  assurance  concerning  such  matters  is 
provided by the extant procurement framework.38 
2.42 As a statutory authority, VicRoads is also not subject to the Purchasing 
Board’s  policies.  In  this  context,  while  the  Inspectorate  and  the  Taskforce 
received  in  July 2011 a presentation on VicRoads procurement processes,  the 
work  plan  does  not  outline  procurement  policies  specific  to VicRoads.  This 
approach was taken notwithstanding that a significant proportion of estimated 
reconstruction expenditure was expected to be the responsibility of VicRoads. 
In November 2012,  Victoria  advised  the  ANAO  that  VicRoads  ‘generally 
conduct their work practices in line with the Victorian Government Purchasing 
Board procurement practices and policies’. 
2.43 In  addition,  the  Board’s  policies  relate  to  procurement  of  goods  and 
services  only  and  do  not  apply,  for  example,  to  building  and  construction 
works.39  In  November  2012,  Victoria  advised  the  ANAO  that  ‘the  rules  of 
procurement in relation to construction procurement are very similar to those 
for goods and services’.  It also provided  the ANAO with an overview of  the 
procurement rules for building and construction works (information that is not 
reflected in the work plan). 
Identifying reconstruction and recovery projects 
2.44 In  being  asked  to  agree  to  the Victorian work  plan,  the Minister  for 
Regional  Australia,  Regional  Development  and  Local  Government  was 
advised by the Taskforce that: 




2.45 In  this  context,  the  work  plan  includes  an  appendix  that  listed 
41 proposed  reconstruction  and  recovery  initiatives  for  which  the  Victorian 
                                                 
38  Queensland also had in place an existing procurement framework. In June 2011, QRA wrote to the 
Inspectorate outlining that the value for money framework developed by QRA provides an ‘overarching 
platform that links with and leverages off the many other policies, processes and governance 
requirements established by state and local governments’ and explaining that QRA had also developed a 
submission guide for NDRRA applications. QRA also introduced a process for assessing NDRRA 
applications in terms of value for money. 
39  See further at http://www.procurement.vic.gov.au/CA2575BA0001417C/pages/home-about-the-vgpb-
scope-of-policies [accessed 27 September 2012]. 
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Government  requested Commonwealth  funding. The work plan costed  these 
initiatives  at  some  $1.02 billion,  comprising  $827.2 million  in  gross 
expenditure,  $122.5 million  in  insurance  offsets  and  $69.1 million  in  internal 
reprioritisation of funding by the state (see Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1 













Category A – emergency 
assistance provided to 
individuals 
4   22.99 Nil Nil 
Category B – restoration of 
essential public assets, 
concessional loans and counter 
disaster operations 
19 637.57 122.52 68.86 
Category C – Community 
Recovery (for community 
facilities) and clean-up and 
recovery grants for small 
businesses and primary 
producers 
8   58.14 Nil   0.20 
Category D – exceptional 
circumstances assistance 9   96.39 Nil Nil 
Fully funded by the state 1   12.08 Nil Nil 
Total 41 827.17 122.52 69.06 
Source: ANAO analysis of Victorian work plan. 
2.46 For  each  initiative,  the  work  plan  identified  the  relevant  NDRRA 
funding  category,  the  lead  state  department,  the  expected  expenditure  and 
(for most of the initiatives) various performance targets. However, as outlined 
below,  in many  instances the work plan did not  identify specific projects but, 
rather,  broad  categories  of  expenditure.  This  was  the  case  notwithstanding 
that, in late‐August 2011, the Inspectorate (after reviewing a draft of the work 
plan)  had  directed  the  Taskforce  to  ‘suggest  to  Victoria  that  the  work  plan 
include  all  projects,  not  just  those  in  excess  of  $5  million’.  There  was  no 
evidence of  this matter being  raised with Victoria.  In  addition,  although  the 
directive  was  recorded  as  an  action  item  arising  from  the  August  meeting, 
there was no report back  to  the  Inspectorate’s next meeting  in relation  to  the 
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was  raised by  the Head of  the Taskforce at  the  following SOCG meeting.  It 
was  agreed  however  by  SOCG  representatives  that  this  was  not  feasible.41 
...Ultimately,  the only  Inspectorate suggestion  that was  reflected  in  the work 
plan related to the key performance indicators. 
2.47 In  addition  to  the  work  plan  often  identifying  broad  categories  of 
expenditure  rather  than  specific  projects,  in  a  number  of  instances  the 
performance  targets  for  initiatives were recorded as  ‘TBA’ or  ‘N/A’. Relevant 
data has not, subsequent to the finalisation of the work plan, been incorporated 
by way of an update to the work plan. Subsequent monthly reports submitted 
by Victoria42  also did  not provide  the missing data, with  the  result  that  the 
monthly reports provided less useful data than would otherwise have been the 
case.43 
2.48 The value of performance  targets being  included  in  the work plan  is 
illustrated  by  the  initiative  to  repair  the  Lower  Loddon  Levees  and 
Groundwater  Bore  Damages,  which  included  a  target  of  repairing 
371 groundwater  monitoring  bores44  and  152  levee  breaches.  As  of  the 
June 2012  monthly  report,  Victoria  was  reporting  that  371  bores  had  been 
repaired  (that  is,  the  full  original  target  had  been  achieved)  and  186  levee 
breaches  had  been  repaired  (22 per cent  higher  than  the  target  number). 
However,  cumulative  expenditure  to  June  2012  of  $1.91  million  was 
significantly below the original estimate of $6.55 million included in the work 
plan45, as well as the updated June 2012 estimate of $3.62 million.46 
                                                 
40  However, the Taskforce’s update for the Inspectorate’s 13 October 2011 meeting advised in relation to 
‘Victoria progress’ that the work plan was currently with the Minister for signature and that comments 
made by Inspectorate members on the work plan have been reflected in the document. 
41  The minutes of the SOCG meeting do not record that the matter was raised, nor that it was agreed that it 
was not feasible to include all projects in the work plan. 
42  The work plan reporting is examined in Chapter 3. 
43  In November 2012, Victoria advised the ANAO that ‘where possible, targets have been amended and will 
continue to do so for future flood monthly reports’. 
44  This target was reported until the May 2012 report, when the target was removed and replaced with 
‘TBC’. The Taskforce did not question the removal of the target. 
45  Comprising $5.02 million of gross expenditure and $1.53 million in insurance offsets. 
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updated  estimate.  In  November  2012,  Victoria  advised  the  ANAO  that  the 
initial damage  estimates  for  the  levees and bores were undertaken at a  time 
when  the  flood water  levels were  still quite high  and  access  to  all  sites was 
limited.  It  also  advised  that  two  rounds  of  public  consultations  were 
conducted,  assessments  were  undertaken,  and  repairs  that  would  result  in 
private  benefits  only  were  removed.  As  a  result,  the  cost  to  undertake  the 
repairs was significantly less than first anticipated. 
Specification of transport infrastructure projects 
2.50 As indicated by Table 2.1, the majority of expenditure was expected to 
relate  to restoration of essential public assets, concessional  loans and counter 




 $20.4 million  for  ‘Repair  of  Flood  Damage  to  the  Regional  Rail 
Network’; and 
 $6 million for  ‘Repair of Wilsons Promontory entrance road  leading to 
Tidal River’. 
2.51 However,  apart  from  the  last  mentioned  initiative  in  respect  to  the 
Wilsons Promontory entrance road, the work plan did not provide any details 
as  to which particular roads or sections of  the regional rail network required 
work.  For  the  Wilsons  Promontory  entrance  road  initiative,  the  work  plan 
indicated that one road had been damaged and had been reopened and further 
stated  that one bridge  repair was  in progress, one bridge had been  repaired, 
10 kilometres of  road had been  repaired,  and  repairs were  in progress  for  a 
further 10 kilometres of road. However, as illustrated in Table 2.2, in respect to 
                                                                                                                                  
46  In connection with the June 2012 monthly report, Victoria advised that ‘the gross expenditure target for 
10 initiatives has been reduced due to a Budget and Expenditure Review Committee decision in 
May 2012 to reallocate a portion of the funding to more recent flood events’. However, the monthly report 
only identified four initiatives as having their expenditure target reduced and, in one of these instances, 
the reported expenditure target remained the same as that included in the work plan. In November 2012, 
Victoria advised the ANAO that the explanation of changes had been omitted in error and that, for future 
reporting, it would ensure that material changes will be explained. 
47  A further $66.85 million from internal state funding reprioritisation and $55.2 million in insurance offsets 
were identified for these four initiatives. Accordingly, overall, these four initiatives represented 
57 per cent of the total funding requirement identified in the work plan. 
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the other  three  initiatives,  the work plan did not seek  to  identify  the specific 
location and nature of work that was proposed to be undertaken and, in other 
instances, relevant summary data was not reported. Accordingly,  for none of 
these  initiatives  did  the  work  plan  provide  sufficient  details  to  support 
effective governance. 
Table 2.2 
Information provided in the work plan for major land transport initiatives 
Initiative Information provided in work plan 
Information the work plan 
recorded as ‘Not reported’ 
or ‘Not applicable’ 
Local government roads 
– Advance payments 
Number of Local Government 
Areas requesting grants and 
advance payments – 28 
Total amount paid and finalised - 
$140 million 
Total advance payments 
made to Councils – Not 
applicable 
Repair of Flood Damage 
to Arterial Roads 
Number of bridges repaired – 68 
Number of bridge repairs in 
progress or have commenced – 68 
Number of roads reopened – 
Not reported 
Number of damaged roads on 
which repairs have 
commenced – Not reported 
Number of work areas – 
repairs completed – Not 
reported 
Number of work areas – 
repairs in progress – Not 
reported 
Repair of Flood Damage 
to the Regional Rail 
Network 
Number of bridge repairs in 
progress – 2 
Number of bridges repaired – 2 
Number of damaged tracks 
repaired – 16 
Number of tracks reopened – 2 
Number of kms of track 
repaired – Not reported 
Number of kms of track 
repairs in progress – Not 
reported 
Source: ANAO analysis of Victorian work plan. 
2.52 Shortly before  the Victorian work plan was approved by  the Minister 
for  Regional  Australia,  Regional  Development  and  Local  Government,  the 
Victorian Government published the Victorian Floods 2010–11 Recovery Progress 
Report.  The  report  was  provided  to  the  Taskforce  for  comment  on 
3 November 2011, prior to its release on 8 December 2011. Among other things, 
that report outlined that: 
In  total, more  than  2,000  roads were damaged. At  the peak of  the  floods  in 
February  2011,  66  arterial  roads were  closed.  ... Approximately  220  bridges, 
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of damage  for  the major  land  transport  initiatives  included  in  the work plan. 
In this context, Victoria advised the ANAO in November 2012 that: 
Agreed,  the work plan did  not provide  specific detail  as  to which  roads  or 
sections  of  the  regional  rail  network  required work  apart  from  the Wilsons 
Promontory  entrance  road  and  (we)  were  never  asked  for  it  from  the 
Taskforce. 
Details  of  specific  road  or  rail  sections  to  be  repaired  are  held  by  councils 
and/or  relevant  state  departments  (for  example,  VicRoads  or  Transport). 
An example  was  provided  to  the  Inspectorate  for  the  Gannawarra  Shire 
Council during their inspection tour in September 2011. 
The Wilsons Promontory entrance road was a late inclusion into the Victorian 
budget  process  (having  occurred  the  week  before),  necessitating  it  to  be  a 
separate  initiative  in  the  state  budget  as  opposed  to  the  damage  which 
occurred  to other arterial roads  in Victoria. This  flowed  through  to  the work 
plan. 





achieved  in  the  expenditure  of  Commonwealth  funds  during  the 
reconstruction  phase,  the  Victorian  Government  will  seek  the  views  of  the 
Inspectorate  on  proposed  project  plans  and  strategies  for  projects  over 
$5 million. 
2.55 In  total, 21 of  the 41  initiatives  listed  in an appendix  to  the work plan 
were  costed  at  greater  than  $5 million  (recognising  that  an  ‘initiative’  may 
comprise a number of projects). The $5 million  threshold became particularly 
significant  in  the  context  of  the Taskforce’s  role  in providing  assurance  that 
value  for  money  is  being  achieved  in  recovery  and  reconstruction 
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expenditure.48  Specifically,  the  Taskforce  has  operated  on  the  basis  that  the 
NPA  prescribes  that  the  Inspectorate  may  not  conduct  a  value  for  money 
review of a Victorian project with a value less than $5 million. 






the  Inspectorate have not  been  sought  on proposed plans  and  strategies  for 
any Victorian reconstruction projects. 
Conclusions 
2.57 The Queensland work plan was developed  through  five drafts over a 
period  of  five  months,  between  February  and  June  2011.  The  plan  was 
forwarded  to  the  office  of  the  Minister  Assisting  the  Attorney‐General  on 
Queensland Floods Recovery  for  agreement  in  early  July  2011. The Minister 
was advised that the purpose of the work plan was to identify specific projects 
to assist with reconstruction and/or recovery but he was not provided with any 
advice  as  to  whether  the  work  plan  met  the  requirements  of  the  NPA.49 
The Minister approved the work plan on 26 August 2011. 
2.58 The Queensland work plan is a one‐page document, with an additional 
one‐page  spreadsheet  attachment  that  outlines  the  format  of  the  monthly 
progress  reports  to be submitted by  the state. The key  role of  the work plan 
was  to  identify  the  reconstruction  and  recovery  projects  towards  which 
NDRRA funding was contributing. However, in developing the work plan, the 
Taskforce  suggested  to QRA  that,  rather  than  identifying  specific projects,  it 
would be sufficient for ‘high level descriptions of work’ to be provided initially 
with  ‘further details added progressively as matters develop’. The Taskforce 
further  proposed  that,  rather  than  developing  a  work  plan  specific  to  the 
                                                 
48  As outlined at paragraph 1.13, the ANAO is conducting a separate performance audit of the Taskforce’s 
value for money work. 
49  By way of comparison, in being asked to agree to the Victorian work plan, the Minister for Regional 
Australia, Regional Development and Local Government was advised by Regional Australia that: ‘As 
required under the National Partnership Agreement for Natural Disaster Reconstruction and Recovery, 
Victoria has developed a Flood Recovery Work Plan that identifies specific projects to assist with 
reconstruction and recovery, and outlines the reporting arrangements with the Commonwealth.’ 
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Taskforce  suggested  to QRA  that,  rather  than  identifying  specific projects,  it 
would be sufficient for ‘high level descriptions of work’ to be provided initially 
with  ‘further details added progressively as matters develop’. The Taskforce 
further  proposed  that,  rather  than  developing  a  work  plan  specific  to  the 
                                                 
48  As outlined at paragraph 1.13, the ANAO is conducting a separate performance audit of the Taskforce’s 
value for money work. 
49  By way of comparison, in being asked to agree to the Victorian work plan, the Minister for Regional 
Australia, Regional Development and Local Government was advised by Regional Australia that: ‘As 
required under the National Partnership Agreement for Natural Disaster Reconstruction and Recovery, 
Victoria has developed a Flood Recovery Work Plan that identifies specific projects to assist with 
reconstruction and recovery, and outlines the reporting arrangements with the Commonwealth.’ 
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developed  by  the  state. However,  the work  plan did  not  include  high  level 
descriptions  of  work  and  it  has  not  been  updated  as  project‐specific 
information has been reported by QRA or otherwise provided to the Taskforce 
(for  the  purposes  of  sampling  projects  for  the  conduct  of  value  for  money 
reviews). The  result  is  that  the work plan does not  identify  a  list of  specific 
projects. 
2.59 Rather  than progressively updating  the work plan as  it had originally 
proposed,  the  Taskforce  has  obtained  some  information  on  reconstruction 
projects  through other means, but  this  information has not  fully satisfied  the 
requirements  of  the  NPA.  In  particular,  some  data  on  approved  projects  is 
provided to the Taskforce to inform its sampling of Queensland reconstruction 
projects for the Inspectorate’s value for money reviews. In addition, since mid‐
2011,  some  information  on  projects  being  delivered  by  LGAs  has  also  been 
reported each month to the QRA board (the Taskforce receives these reports). 
2.60 Regional Australia has advised  the ANAO  that, as  the new oversight 
and governance arrangements were implemented, it had became clear that the 
specific requirements of the NPAs did not necessarily reflect the practicalities 
of  rolling out  the  reconstruction programs. However,  the  reviews  completed 
by  the Taskforce and  the  relevant  state body  in August and September 2012 
found  that  the  arrangements  were  largely  effective  at  coordinating  and 






plan  was  agreed  to  by  the  Australian  Government  Minister  for  Regional 
Australia,  Regional  Development  and  Local  Government  on 
16 December 2011. 
2.62 The finalised Victorian flood recovery work plan  is a more substantial 
document  than  that  developed  for  Queensland.  The  work  plan  includes  an 
appendix  that  listed 41 proposed  reconstruction and  recovery  ‘initiatives’  for 
which  the  Victorian  Government  requested  Commonwealth  funding.  The 
work  plan  costed  these  initiatives  at  some  $1.02 billion,  comprising 
$827.2 million  in  gross  expenditure,  $122.5 million  in  insurance  offsets  and 
$69.1 million  in  internal  reprioritisation of  funding by  the  state. However,  in 
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the  work  plan  includes  a  discrete  section  titled  ‘procurement 
management’  that  outlines  the  role  of  the  Victorian  Government 
Purchasing  Board,  key  procurement  requirements  under  the  state 
procurement  framework and  the operation of  ‘standard procurement’ 




21  of  the  41  initiatives  listed  in  the  appendix  to  the work plan were 
costed at greater than $5 million. However, for none of these initiatives 
did the work plan outline the project plans and strategies that the state 




                                                 
50  They also do not separate the costs of the recovery and reconstruction activities arising from the 2011 
events (covered by the NPA) from earlier flooding events that are not within the scope of the NPA, 
particularly for LGAs. 
51  The latter enables streamlined and flexible procurement policies and processes to be adopted in 
circumstances such as those that arose as a result of the flooding. 
52  The Inspectorate’s terms of reference included reviewing contractual frameworks, tendering processes 
and project management systems. 
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2.64 The ANAO  recommends  that  the Department  of Regional Australia, 
Local Government, Arts and Sport, in preparation for the forthcoming reviews 
of  the National Partnership Agreements,  identify  the most effective means of 
obtaining  the  project  level  information  on  the  respective  reconstruction 
programs  required by  the Agreements  to be  reported on and,  if appropriate, 
seek amendments to the Agreements. 
Regional Australia’s response: 
2.65 Agreed.  The  department  agrees  that  any  future  National  Partnership 
Agreements or extensions thereof should be informed by the practical experiences and 
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3. Reporting on Work Plan Delivery 
This  chapter  examines  the  Taskforce’s  role  in  state  monitoring  and  reporting  of 
delivery against the work plans. 
Introduction 
3.1 The Taskforce’s  terms of reference required  it  to provide  the National 
Disaster  Recovery  Committee  of  Cabinet  with  monthly  progress  reports  on 
state plans for recovery, including updated estimates of the Commonwealth’s 
liability  under  NDRRA.  In  January  2013,  Regional  Australia  advised  the 
ANAO that: 
The  Taskforce  did  report  monthly  to  the  National  Disaster  Recovery 
Committee of Cabinet (later the Regional Australia and Regional Development 
Committee of Cabinet) until the Committee agreed that the Taskforce should 
report  every other month. On  top of  the Cabinet memoranda,  the Taskforce 
provided  weekly  updates  to  the  Cabinet  Committee  members  until 
February 2012, then fortnightly until April 2012, then monthly until June 2012, 
and  continues  to  report  in  the  alternate  month  to  that  in  which  a 
memorandum on reconstruction progress is submitted to the Committee. 
3.2 In addition, the Taskforce has advised the ANAO that it has provided 
meetings of  the Australian Government Reconstruction  Inspectorate with  an 
overview of recovery and reconstruction progress in Victoria and Queensland. 
3.3 In  this  context,  the  Victorian  NPA  outlined  that  the  state  and  the 
Commonwealth  acknowledged  that  the  circumstances  of  the  Agreement 
provided  ‘a  clear need  for  reporting  arrangements  that are particular  to  this 
Agreement.’ It also stated that the state and the Commonwealth would agree 




(b)  progress  with  expenditure  under  NDRRA,  including  advice  on  the 
level of expenditure in key areas of the reconstruction effort; 
(c)  revisions to estimates of costs; and 
                                                 
53  Reporting was to operate monthly for a period of six months, with the frequency and format of 
subsequent reporting to be agreed in light of the milestones and projects specified in the work plan. 
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(b)  progress  with  expenditure  under  NDRRA,  including  advice  on  the 
level of expenditure in key areas of the reconstruction effort; 
(c)  revisions to estimates of costs; and 
                                                 
53  Reporting was to operate monthly for a period of six months, with the frequency and format of 
subsequent reporting to be agreed in light of the milestones and projects specified in the work plan. 
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(d)  progress  against  the  recovery  plans  of  the  most  severely  affected 
communities as agreed by Victoria and the Commonwealth, including 
the extent to which milestones are being achieved. 
3.4 The  work  plan  reporting  obligations  included  in  the  Victorian  NPA 
were  broadly  the  same  as  those  that  had  been  included  in  the  Queensland 
NPA. The only area of substantive difference related  to  the  fourth data  item. 
Specifically,  the  Queensland  NPA  required  reporting  against  the  strategic 
plans  of  each  affected  community  (rather  than  being  limited  to  the  most 
severely affected communities) as well as data on any additional funding that 
was being leveraged (no such data was required to be reported by Victoria).54 
3.5 To assess  the Taskforce’s administration of  the  requirements  included 









(targets).  It also  restated  the obligation under  the NDRRA determination  for 
audited  financial  statements  to  be  provided  at  the  time  the  state  acquits  its 
spending of the $500 million advance payment. 





plan  to  be  reported  by  Queensland  through  the  provision  of  the  monthly 
report in the format at Attachment A. 
                                                 
54  Specifically, the fourth item in clause 25 of the Queensland NPA was ‘(d) progress against the strategic 
plans of each affected community, including the extent to which milestones are being achieved and what 
additional funding is being leveraged.’ 
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projects,  Attachment  A  to  the  work  plan  did  not  require  any  reporting  on 
specific  reconstruction  and  recovery  projects.55  Rather  it  required  that 
aggregate  financial data be provided  for each LGA area,  the  four elements of 





funding  sought  divided  by  NDRRA  category  together  with  data  on 
amounts  under  assessment,  amounts  assessed  as  ineligible  and 
amounts approved by QRA); and 
 the  current  NDRRA  budget  estimate,  divided  in  one  section  into 
various funding categories and in another section by asset class. 
3.9 The work plan also provided that the Commonwealth may request that 
Queensland  provide  regular  reports  on  nominated  key  projects  as  well  as 
where  a  ‘project  tolerance  breach’  is  anticipated  or  has  occurred. 
In November 2012, the Taskforce advised the ANAO that  it requests progress 




any  instances  where  updates  on  other  projects  had  been  requested  or 
provided.  As  well,  there  have  been  no  instances  where  the  Taskforce  has 
nominated any key projects on which regular reports are required. There have 
also been no  instances where a  ‘project  tolerance breach’ has  led  to a request 
for regular project reports. 
  
                                                 
55  Not requiring the state to report on specific reconstruction projects was proposed by the Taskforce, at the 
same time that the Taskforce proposed that the work plan not identify specific reconstruction projects 
(see further at paragraph 2.20). 
56  Namely: utilities; day labour; Brisbane City Council - Ferries and Riverwalk; and Cassowary Coast – 
Category D. 
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Minister,  Queensland  Cabinet,  federal  ministers  and  the  public  of 
progress on  recovery and  reconstruction. The high  level, public Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) report was to be initially focused on recovery, 
with  subsequent  reports  to  shift  to  reconstruction  and  transition. 
The CEO  report was  intended  to  provide  a  summary  of Queensland 
flood  and  cyclone  events,  an  outline  of  information  sourced  from 
government agencies and present a number of metrics; 
 further  detail  would  be  provided  in  Chief  Financial  Officer  (CFO) 
reports to government, including an outline of NDRRA payments and 
financial reports for internal budgeting; and 
 the reports would evolve as matters progress and  in  light of  feedback 
received. 
3.12 The  publication  of  the CEO  report  commenced with  the March  2011 
report57, shortly after  the NPA was signed but some months before  the work 
plan  was  approved  (on  26 August  2011).  In  March  2011,  QRA  commenced 
reporting on  its  ‘recovery phase’ which was  to be  from  January  to  June 2011. 
This  was  to  be  followed  by  the  ‘reconstruction  phase’  from  June  2011  to 
December 2012 (subsequently extended to June 2014). Definitions of the work 





                                                 
57  See http://www.qldreconstruction.org.au/publications-guides/reports/monthly-reports/2011.  
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capacity  and  require  repairs  to  restore  it  to  full  operating  capacity 
(i.e. damaged and requiring reconstruction). 
3.13 Although the work plan reporting template was established during the 
recovery phase,  the work plan  itself was not  agreed until  the  reconstruction 
phase had commenced. Also, DTMR’s definition of the recovery phase was not 
provided until the reconstruction phase had commenced. 







3.15 These  reports  were  prepared  by  QRA  for  its  purposes,  and  not  in 
response to the signing of the NPA. Neither the CEO report nor the CFO report 
was prepared  in  the  format specified  in Attachment A  to  the approved work 
plan (see paragraph 3.8). In November 2012, the Taskforce advised the ANAO 




3.16 Against  this  background,  the  CFO  reports  categorise  reconstruction 
funding arrangements according to the following broad categories: 
 Counter Disaster Operations (CDO); 
 Emergent Works,  (defined  by  the Queensland  state  government58  as: 





3.17 However,  several  important  terms  specified  in  the  CFO  reports  and 
Attachment A  to  the work plan,  including  emergent works,  are not defined 
                                                 
58  A fuller definition and further discussion of Emergent Works is at Appendix 3. 
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58  A fuller definition and further discussion of Emergent Works is at Appendix 3. 
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59 
under NDRRA. The CFO  reports note  that REPA  can  include  reconstruction 
and  emergent works  for  the  restoration of uninsured  essential public  assets. 
This would potentially place REPA under Category B  for NDRRA purposes, 
whereas  the  NDRRA  determination  defines  some  elements  of  restoration 




included  data  on  additional  2011  and  2012  disaster  events  that  were  not 
covered by  the NPA. The May 2012 report also noted that QRA was now the 
administering authority in relation to all  ‘open’ submissions for an additional 
10  declared  ‘prior  events’  that  had  occurred  in  Queensland  between 
August 2007 and May 2009. As a  result,  it was not always clear whether  the 
reported  metrics  included  all  events  managed  by  QRA,  only  those  events 
covered by the NPA, or some other combination. In this context, QRA advised 
the ANAO in November 2012 that: 
The report  in  the majority  identifies  the events  included within each piece of 
information.  I also note  that NPA events are separated  in appendix D of  the 
report. 
3.19 The data sets included in the appendix referred to by QRA have varied 
over  time. The appendix  currently  includes  (for LGAs but not  state delivery 
agencies)  some  project‐specific  data.  Specifically:  the  project  identifier;  a 
categorisation of the type of works being undertaken (such as emergent works 
or  counter‐disaster  operations);  whether  the  project  submission  has  been 
approved or not; project start and completion dates; and  the extent  to which 
physical  works  have  been  completed  (as  a  percentage  of  the  total  works). 
Although earlier reports included the value of the project (but without details 




                                                 
59  The work plan provided (at clause 8) that the reporting template can be amended to reflect changing 
circumstances. 
60  The definitions of recovery and reconstruction are discussed in more detail in Appendix 4. 
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respect of  the events covered by  the NPA.  Further, additional  information is 
provided  in  QRA  Reconstruction  and  Governance  Reports  and  there  is 
significant ongoing dialogue between the Taskforce and QRA on the damage 
and reconstruction from the events covered in the NPA. 
3.21 Nevertheless,  the  reporting has not  included  the  four elements of  the 
Queensland  Local  Council  Package  and  each  DTMR  region  (there  are 
12 regions). Also, reporting on each SDA ceased in September 2012, when this 
was  replaced  by  aggregated  reporting  for  DTMR  and  for  ‘Other  SDAs 
Combined’  from October 2012. Accordingly, reporting  to  the Commonwealth 
has  not  met  the  requirements  set  out  at  Attachment  A  of  the  work  plan 
(see paragraph 3.8). 
Progress with NDRRA expenditure 
3.22 Financial reporting, including the reporting required through the work 
plan  (Attachment  A),  was  provided  through  the  CFO  reports.  The  QRA 
2010–11 Annual Report notes the following accounting treatment in relation to 
NDRRA grants received: 




3.23 The  CFO  monthly  reports  provided  to  the  Commonwealth  were 
prepared on a different basis.61 Grants received by QRA from Commonwealth 




was  that  the  full  extent  of  Commonwealth  and  state  government  financial 
assistance was not visible  from  the CFO  reports. A  summary of  income and 
expenses reported in the CFO monthly reports is shown in Figure 3.1. 
                                                 
61  In November 2012, QRA advised the ANAO that the CFO report is a monthly management report and 
that financial and management reports do not have to be prepared on the same basis. 
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Total income to QRA and income/expense reported in CFO reports 
 
Source: ANAO analysis of QRA CFO monthly reports and Commonwealth Budget Papers. 
3.24 The data shows that neither the $2 billion62 that had been advanced by 
the  Commonwealth  to  Queensland  by  the  end  of  June  2011,  nor  the 
Queensland state government contribution of $1.8 billion  in July 2011,  is fully 
reflected  in  the  CFO  reports.  The  additional  $1.9 billion63  advance  payment 
                                                 
62  In two installments, the first advance payment of $1 billion was made to QRA on 7 March 2011, and the 
second advance payment of $1.050 billion was made on 7 June 2011. A third payment of $206 million 
was made on 28 June 2011, for the Commonwealth’s share of the $330 million Local Government 
Package. 
63  The additional advance to Queensland comprised $500 million announced in the 2011–12 Budget that 
was expected to be paid in 2011–12 and a further advance payment of $1.4 billion in 2011–12 to meet: 
the cost of claims by the Queensland Government to ensure reconstruction work could progress as 
quickly as possible; higher than expected costs for the Queensland 2010–11 floods and TC Yasi; and 
delays in claims for reimbursement for disaster restoration work undertaken in 2008, 2009 and 2010. The 
Australian Government had also advanced Financial Assistance Grants, which are delivered under a 























































































QRA CFO monthly reports
Commonwealth Advance Payments to Queensland 
Queensland State Government Contribution 
Income Reported in QRA Financial Statements
Total Advances from QRA to State and Local Authorities (Discontinued Aug 12) 
Total Cash Payments to LGA/SDAs (From Apr 12) 
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The  total of  funding  received  for  the  financial period  to  29 February  2012  is 
$2 162 million. 
3.25 The  less  than  full  disclosure  discussed  above  highlights  the 
shortcomings of the Taskforce placing reliance wholly on the reports produced 
by the states (for their own specific governance and legislative requirements), 









the  Commonwealth  may  provide  advance  payments  if  the  Minister 
(the Attorney‐General)  is  satisfied  that  exceptional  circumstances  exist. 
Exceptional circumstances are not further defined under NDRRA. The advance 
payments  from  the Commonwealth  and  the  state  contribution  increased  the 
overall budget available to QRA to approximately $6 billion. Figure 3.1 shows 
that  payments made  to  LGAs  and  SDAs  by  QRA  have  significantly  lagged 





the  NDRRA  Determination  under  which  they  were  made.  Whether  the 
advance payments lagged demand or not is irrelevant. 
3.27 In relation to the relevance of the work of the Taskforce to the situation 
where  advance  payments  were  lagging  demand64,  where  LGAs  and  state 
delivery agencies do not require additional NDRRA funding for projects above 
that advanced to them, there is little financial incentive for progress reports to 
                                                 
64  In terms of the relevance of the timing and quantum of the advance payments to the Taskforce, 
clause 41 of the Queensland NPA requires the Taskforce to have ‘as its sole focus the oversight and 
coordination of Commonwealth interests in relation to recovery and reconstruction efforts’. 
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clause 41 of the Queensland NPA requires the Taskforce to have ‘as its sole focus the oversight and 
coordination of Commonwealth interests in relation to recovery and reconstruction efforts’. 
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be  submitted. The  lack  of progress  reports  on projects65  is  a matter  that has 
impacted on the conduct of value for money reviews by the Inspectorate.66 
Applications for NDRRA funding 
3.28 The reporting template agreed as part of the work plan (Attachment A) 
committed QRA  to  the provision of data on project  submissions  received by 
QRA,  including  the amount of  funding sought divided by NDRRA category, 
together  with  data  on  amounts  under  assessment,  amounts  assessed  as 
ineligible, and amounts approved by QRA. However, there were a number of 
changes  in  the  data  series  over  time,  and  a  complete  set  of  information 
compliant  with  the  work  plan  requirement  is  not  available  from  the 
CFO reports. 




                                                 
65  In this regard, the November 2012 CFO report indicates how very few progress and finalisation reports 
have been received, including that there have been none from state delivery agencies. This situation is 
notwithstanding that the disaster events occurred more than 21 months earlier and in excess of 
$5.8 billion of works were reported as ‘complete’. 
66  The ‘talking points’ prepared by the Taskforce for the Regional Australia Secretary’s attendance at the 
November 2012 QRA board meeting noted that project progress reports are often received only after the 
project has been completed and that no project completion reports had been received to date by the 
Taskforce. (This was also still the case at the time of preparation of this ANAO report). 
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Advance payments to and from QRA - approved applications for NDRRA 
funding and maximum Commonwealth liability 
 
Source: ANAO analysis of QRA CFO reports and Commonwealth budget papers. 
3.30 The  data  shows  that  approved  applications  for  recovery  and 
reconstruction  initiatives  have  increased  over  time  but  have  remained 
significantly  lower  than  the  Commonwealth  and  state  contributions.  In  this 
context,  under  the  NDRRA  determination  the  Commonwealth  liability  is 
approximately 75 per cent of the face value of the QRA approved applications. 
3.31 The data  shows  that,  in February  2012, when  the  additional  advance 
payment  of  $1.9  billion  was  made  to  Queensland,  there  was  less  than 
$2.2 billion  in  approved  applications  on  hand,  compared  to  the  $4 billion 
available  from  Commonwealth  and  state  contributions.  At  the  end  of 
January 2012, when the additional advance payment to Queensland was being 
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Advance payments  by QRA  to LGAs  and  SDAs  remained  at  approximately 
earlier  levels, notwithstanding  the exceptional  circumstances.  In  this  context, 
Regional Australia advised the ANAO in November 2012 that: 
This is not an issue for which the Taskforce has direct responsibility.  Funding 




3.32 Clause  17  of  the NPA with Queensland  indicates  that  the work plan 
should  be  developed  consistently  with  Schedule  A  ‘Principles  Related  to 
Proposals for Additional Natural Disaster Assistance’. Schedule A in turn, sets 





3.33 On  16  February  2011,  the Queensland Under Treasurer  informed  the 
House  of  Representatives  Standing  Committee  on  Economics  that  the 
Queensland  Government  had  in  place  appropriate  insurance  through  its 
captive insurer. The Under Treasurer also observed that there were insurances 
in place  for  certain  assets  that had been  impacted by  the  floods  that do not 
qualify for NDRRA arrangements.67 
3.34 It  was  also  clarified  that  Queenslandʹs  captive  insurer  covers 
government budget‐funded agencies, and outside of  that, public utilities and 
commercial entities would make  their own decisions  in  relation  to  insurance 
arrangements,  and  many  would  seek  external  insurance  to  cover  events.68 
In this  context,  QRA  reporting  against  the  six  lines  of  reconstruction  (the 
building  line)  indicates  that  ‘insurance’  is one of  its metrics. However, when 
this metric was  reported,  it  related only  to  insurance of domestic dwellings. 
QRA  reports  are  silent  on  the  amount  and  type  of  insurance  held  over 
government assets and the amount of insurance offset that would be available 
                                                 
67  Mr Bradley, Proof Committee Hansard, House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics, 
16 February 2011, p.20. 
68  Ibid. 
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against  the  Commonwealth  and  state  funding  assistance  provided  to  those 
entities. In November 2012, QRA advised the ANAO that this was because: 









and  the  Australian  Government’s  decisions  to  make  substantial  advance 
payments to each state, were based on early damage estimates. In Queensland, 
damage assessments  from  the  flooding events prior  to TC Yasi  indicated  that 
there  had  been  $5.6  billion  of  damage,  including  $2.3 billion  of  damage  to 
Queensland state‐controlled roads. 
3.37 Following TC Yasi, QRA requested a twelve month extension of time to 
claim  for  earlier  NDRRA  eligible  disaster  events  that  occurred  between 
September  2009  and  February  2011.  Normally  the  allowable  time  limit  for 




project  management  costs,  by  bundling  Queensland  and  local  government 
works within regions as single projects. Although the supporting assumptions 
were not supplied, Queensland DTMR analysis indicated the net present value 
of a  three year program of works  to be $300 million  to $500 million  less  than 
that of a two year program. 
3.38 The Queensland work plan had not been agreed at the time the request 
was  considered. The  implications of  the extension were  that Commonwealth 
funding would cover  larger bundles of work, rather than the specific disaster 
events  described  in  the  NPA  and  through  the  work  plans.  The  Australian 
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against  the  Commonwealth  and  state  funding  assistance  provided  to  those 
entities. In November 2012, QRA advised the ANAO that this was because: 









and  the  Australian  Government’s  decisions  to  make  substantial  advance 
payments to each state, were based on early damage estimates. In Queensland, 
damage assessments  from  the  flooding events prior  to TC Yasi  indicated  that 
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September  2009  and  February  2011.  Normally  the  allowable  time  limit  for 
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Government  agreed  to  the  extension  request  from  QRA  subject  to  three 
conditions:69 
 assurance that the extension will not result  in an  increase  in the scope 
of works being reimbursed under NDRRA; 
 provision of a detailed profile of expected expenditure for the specified 
disaster  events,  to  allow  the  Commonwealth  to  adjust  its  forward 
budget estimates; and 
 inclusion  of  both  state  and  local  government  works  in  the  revised 
profile  and  reasonable  allowance  for  the  associated  savings  or 
efficiencies. 
3.39 QRA  responded  that  it  noted  the  terms  of  the  extension  and  had 
written  to  all  councils  in  order  to  clarify  the  arrangements  and  to  request 
further  information on expected expenditure profiles  for  the  (now expanded) 
specified events. QRA also engaged a consultant firm of quantity surveyors to 
review  the  budget  estimates  for  the  2011–12  MYEFO  update.70  The  report 
methodology  did  not  involve  any  independent  engineering  assessments  of 
damage, but rather a collation of financial estimates provided by Queensland 





                                                 
69  This letter was from AGD and on 17 August 2011, the Secretary of Regional Australia wrote to the 
Inspectorate along similar lines. 
70  In November 2012, Regional Australia advised the ANAO that the MYEFO budget estimates process 
does not involve the Taskforce. 
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estimate –  
2011–12 Budget to 
MYEFO 
$’000 
DTMR 2009 events71 404 000 404 000 — 
DTMR 2010 events72 1 728 000 1 365 000 (363 000) 
DTMR 2011 events 2 893 000 3 256 000 363 000 
Additional 2011 events 
(DTMR) — 275 000 275 000 
SDA 2011 events 1 031 000  875 854 (155 146) 
Additional 2011 events 
(SDA) — 10 000 10 000 
Local Government 
Authorities 2011 2 415 744 2 784 015 368 271 
Queensland Local 
Government Package 330 000 330 000 — 
Total 6 669 744 7 530 869 861 125 
Source: ANAO analysis of QRA Independent Quantity Surveyor Review, Summary Report, Review of 
Forecast Cost Estimate for Local Government Authorities Reconstruction and Review of Forecast 
Budget Estimate for State Department Agencies Reconstruction, November 2011. 
3.40 Examination of the data relating to the consultant’s report shows that, 
of the 73 LGAs in Queensland, 24 either had no damage to report, or reduced 
their  estimate  of  damage  at  2011–12  MYEFO,  and  49  other  LGAs  reported 
increases. A summary of the adjustments is in Table 3.2. 
                                                 
71  The estimate from 2009 is not included in the overall total, but is shown to illustrate the financial impact 
on the scope of work to be undertaken as a result of the extension discussed at paragraph 3.37. 
72  To avoid double counting, this row is not included in the overall total, but is shown to illustrate the 
transfer of previous year events into the 2011 estimate. 
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Consultant’s recommended MYEFO adjustment – LGA component 
(from Row 7 of Table 3.1) 368 271 
24 LGAs with nil damage, or decreases from 
initial damage estimate (355 222) — 
49 LGAs with increased damage estimate 517 038 — 
Net increase in LGA damage estimate 161 816 
Difference – LGA contingency retained by QRA 206 455 
Source: ANAO analysis of Taskforce documents. 
3.41 The data also shows that, if the LGA assessments of damage were taken 
at  face value,  the LGA adjustment would have been $162 million,  instead of 
$368 million.  The  consultant’s  report  contains  a  number  of  qualifying 
statements  over  the  reliability  of  LGA  estimates  but  does  not  disclose  the 
calculation that led to the $368 million adjustment recommended in the report. 
The  end  result  is  that  QRA  established  and  retained  $206 million  as  an 
‘LGA contingency’.  The  need  for  a  contingency  was  not  discussed  in  the 
consultant’s report. No further enquiries were made by the Taskforce about the 
report and as a result, there is a lack of adequate documentation that explains 
the  Commonwealth’s  agreement  to  the  amount  and  use  of  the  LGA 
contingency funds retained by QRA. 
3.42 Ministers were briefed on  the  content of  the  report by  the Taskforce. 
Notwithstanding  the  envisaged  focus  for  the Taskforce  on  oversighting  and 
coordinating  the Commonwealth’s  interests,  the  report was  not provided  to 
central and stakeholder agencies. For example: 
 the  Taskforce’s  advice  to  Ministers  did  not  include  Finance’s 
perspective  of  the  impact  the  increase would have  on  the Australian 
Government’s position; and 
 as  the  terms and conditions applying  to  the Australian Government’s 
agreement  to  extend  the  time  for  lodging  NDRRA  claims  had  been 
developed  by  EMA,  consultation  with  EMA  would  have  been 
beneficial. As  a  result,  EMA’s  assessment  of  the  extent  to which  the 
gross  annual  figures  provided  in  the  report  met  the  requirement  of 
detailed expenditure profiles and savings  targets was not provided  in 
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SDA  adjustment  for  2011,  observing  that  it  related  to  bushfires  in 
Queensland in October 2011.73 
3.43 In  November  2012,  Regional  Australia  advised  the  ANAO  that  the 
Taskforce  ‘did  not  accept  the  QRA  report  in  any  formal  arrangement’. 
Nevertheless,  by  not  seeking  a  wider  view  from  the  central  agencies  and 
stakeholder  departments,  the  Taskforce  increased  the  risk  to  the 
Commonwealth  that  the  damage  estimates would  be managed  to maximise 




Reconciliation of CFO report data to totals reported 
 
Source: ANAO analysis of QRA CFO reports. 
                                                 
73  Other SDA inclusions indicate the estimate for Queensland Health had increased from $18 million to 
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following  the  completion  of QRA’s  September  review  of NDRRA  estimates. 
This  additional  funding  requirement  is  outside  the  scope  of  the  NPA,  as  it 
relates to additional natural disasters that occurred after the period covered by 
the NPA, but within the scope of QRA’s responsibilities within that state. This 
situation  again highlights  the divergence between  the  scope  and purpose  of 
QRA’s  reporting produced  for  its purposes, and  the  scope of  the Taskforce’s 
responsibilities,  with  the  Taskforce  not  seeking  any  reporting  specific  to  its 
responsibilities.  In  addition,  no  explanation was  sought  by  the  Taskforce  in 
relation to the anomalous June 2012 reported amounts. 
3.45 Following  the 2011–12 MYEFO  (published on 29 November 2011),  the 
reports  and  tables  in  the CFO  report were  adjusted  and  the  revised  figures 
were reflected in the December 2011 and January 2012 reports.74 In response to 
ANAO  analysis  of  these  and  subsequent  CFO  reports,  in  November  2012, 
Regional Australia acknowledged  to  the ANAO  that  there were a number of 
reporting  errors  (which  Regional  Australia  indicated  had  been  raised  with 
QRA  by  the  Taskforce)  but  that  ‘they  are  irrelevant  in  the  end  as  NDRRA 
funding  is a  reimbursement arrangement on  the basis of audited statements’. 
Nevertheless,  one  of  the  Taskforce’s  defined  roles  is  to  provide  updated 
estimates to Australian Government Ministers on the estimated liability under 
NDRRA. 
QRA CEO reporting 





reconstruction set out  in  the Operation Queenslander plan. At  the time, QRA 
stated  that  an  expanded  range  of  headline  metrics  would  be  presented 
quarterly. While there were some revisions to the headline metrics over time, 
monthly CEO reports continued, supplemented by several reconstruction and 
                                                 
74  In November 2012, Regional Australia advised the ANAO that ‘MYEFO updates were settled between 
the Commonwealth and the Queensland treasuries. QRA and EMA also feed into the process. The 
Taskforce was not part of this process.’ 
  
ANAO Audit Report No.24 2012–13 







3.48 The  CEO  monthly  reports  contained  extensive  data,  charts  and 
information. However, problems evident with  the CFO data, particularly  the 
reporting  of  non‐contiguous  data  sets  between  the  ‘recovery’  and 
‘reconstruction’  phases,  were  similarly  evident  in  the  CEO  reports.  For 
example,  the  transport  and main  roads  line of  recovery, which  is where  the 
major  portion  of  Commonwealth  funds  will  be  applied,  was  aimed  at 
reconnecting  people  and  enabling  the  re‐supply  of  communities  across  the 
state.  In  the sixteen months between April 2011 and August 2012,  there were 
four non‐contiguous data sets used to report on roads damaged and recovered, 
with  QRA  advising  the  ANAO  in  November  2012  that  the  ‘data  metrics 
continued  to  evolve  as  the  stages  of  recovery  changed’.  A  summary  of  the 
differences is in Table 3.3. 
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Summary of data series to report road damage, repair and recovery — 
QRA CEO report 
QRA CEO report - Roads and Transport Reporting Metrics 
First Series 

















as at previous 
report 
Km 
May – 11 9 170 6 627 – – – 
Jun – 11 9 170 6 934 2 236 307 6 627 
Jul – Aug 11 9 170 8 482 688 1 548 – 0 6 934 – 8 484 
Second Series 















Sep – Oct 11 6 070 157 – 208 688 5 913 – 5 862 8 482 
Nov 11 – Feb 12 6 709 556 – 1 133 688 – 687 6 153 – 5 576 8 482 – 8 483 
Third Series 




















Mar – May 12 9 170 8 482 7 330 – 
10 890 
2 906 1 133 – 1 510 
Fourth Series 
Jun – Aug 12 20 610 19 922 10 890 8 947 – 9 737 1 540 – 1 821 
Source: ANAO analysis of QRA CEO reports. 
3.49 The  table  shows  that  the  first  data  series  was  straightforward  and 
simple  to  interpret. The CEO report of September 2011, which  introduces  the 
second data series, notes  that  in  line with  the  transition  to  the reconstruction 
phase, metrics reporting the progress on reconstruction of state roads and rail 
assets  were  revised  to  align  with  the  Queensland  Transport  Network 
Reconstruction  Program  Strategic  Plan.75  As  illustrated  in  Table  3.3,  this 
                                                 
75  This plan also included earthworks/batter locations, silt and debris locations and structure locations (that 
is, bridges, causeways and culverts in the road corridor) which were not previously reported. 
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difference  between  the  numbers  of  kilometres  of  road  being  reported  as 
damaged for recovery purposes and damaged for reconstruction purposes. As 
discussed  in  Appendix  4,  there  is  no  provision  under  the  NDRRA 
determination  for  a  distinction  to  be  made  between  funding  ‘recovery’  and 
‘reconstruction’.  As  well,  no  explanation  was  provided  for  the  additional 
639 kilometres of damage reported between October and November 2011. 
3.50 The  third  data  series  began  in  March  2012  as  a  result  of  additional 
NDRRA activations arising  from North Queensland storms and  flooding and 
the East Coast hybrid  low, which was combined  into  the one activation. The 
reason for the increase in the number of kilometres of roads affected shown in 
the  fourth  data  series  is  not  clear  from  the  reports.  The  June  2012  report 
indicates  that  a  further  ‘baseline’  process  had  been  conducted  at  the  time, 
although  few  details  were  provided  to  support  the  revised  estimate.  In 
particular, no explanation was provided  for  the 125 per  cent  increase  in one 
month  in  the number of kilometres of  roads  affected by  the  2010–11  events, 
from 9170 reported in May 2012, to 20 610 in June 2012. 
3.51 Frequent changes to the reporting metrics over a relatively short period 
of  time  create  uncertainty  over  the  status  of  actual  reconstruction  work  on 
roads.  Although  there  were  additional  metrics  provided  on  road 
reconstruction not shown above, there was no overall reconciliation conducted 
and  no  explanation  provided  for  the  difference  between  the  numbers  of 
kilometres  reported  as  being  ‘baselined’  in  September  2011  and  the  revised 
baseline figure of 2012. 








roads.  However,  the  ANAO  notes  that  the  frequent  changes  in  data  series 
meant that it was not possible to assess whether progress was being made. 
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roads.  However,  the  ANAO  notes  that  the  frequent  changes  in  data  series 
meant that it was not possible to assess whether progress was being made. 
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Progress against each community recovery plan 
3.54 The fourth and final item that each NPA required be reported on by the 
states  each month  related  to progress  against  the  recovery plans  of  affected 
communities. 
3.55 For Queensland, the NPA required reporting against the strategic plans 
of  each  affected  community  (rather  than  being  limited  to  the most  severely 
affected communities as was the case with Victoria). This reporting was also to 
include data on any additional funding that was being leveraged (no such data 
was  required  to be  reported by Victoria). As discussed  above,  the  reporting 
template  agreed  in  the  Queensland  work  plan  consists  of  a  table  showing 
expenditure, NDRRA advance payments made, and expenditure assessed by 
QRA  for  each  Queensland  LGA  and  SDA.  However,  the  agreed  reporting 
provisions do not provide for community recovery plans. 
3.56 While  the Taskforce did not request any specific reporting against  the 
recovery  plans  of  affected  communities,  QRA’s  monthly  CEO  reports 
contained  a  brief  summary  of  community  recovery  initiatives  in  several 
sections  of  the  report.  For  example,  under  the  Human  and  Social  line  of 




with  community  recovery  and  coordination  centres  and  provided  further 
details  on  a  $39  million  Community  Recovery  and  Wellbeing  Package.  The 
progress  report  noted  that  local  councils  had  received  funding  through  the 
flexible  funding  program  to  support  recovery  activities  and  discussed  the 
establishment  of  24  community development  officers  to work  as part  of  the 
community  development  and  engagement  initiative.  However,  the  progress 
report  provided  insufficient  detail  on  the  strategic  plans  of  each  affected 
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it  was  not  feasible  for  Queensland  to  do  a  plan  for  each  community;  the 
Commonwealth accepted this. 






month.  In  accordance  with  this  timeframe,  the  meeting  of  26 October  2011 
considered the performance report for 30 September 2011. However there is no 
record of the 31 August 2011 report (which was forwarded to the Taskforce on 
23  September  2011)  having  been  received  and  considered  by  the  Taskforce 
prior to the October meeting. 
3.61 The  next  meeting  was  held  on  8  December  2011,  at  which  time  the 
progress report for October 2011 was provided. This was 37 days after the end 
of  October  and  is  considerably  longer  than  the  25  day  average  taken  by 
Victoria to supply data in the earlier periods. The average period of time taken 
to  supply  reports  from  December  2011  to  June  2012  was  36  days.  The 
December  2011  report  was  provided  for  the  7 February  2012  meeting. 
However,  the  November  performance  report,  which  was  forwarded  to  the 
Taskforce on 9 January 2012, was not held  in the Taskforce’s records and had 
not been separately analysed, in preparation for the February 2012 meeting. 
3.62 There  is  no  documented  process within  the Taskforce  to  analyse  the 
information  reported  each month.  In  addition, on occasions  the  Inspectorate 
has  been  provided  with  relatively  dated  information.  For  example,  at  its 
18 September  2012  meeting,  the  Inspectorate  was  provided  with  data  on 
Victorian  flood  recovery  progress.  However,  the  data  relied  upon  by  the 
Taskforce was drawn from the June 2012 monthly report. The briefing from the 
Taskforce  stated  that  these were  ‘the  latest  figures  released by  the Victorian 
Government’. However, records provided to the ANAO by Victoria indicated 
that  the  July  2012  report  had  been  forwarded  to  the  Taskforce  on 
13 September 2012. 
3.63 Over time, changes were made to the reports provided, and this made 
it  difficult  to  assess whether  or  not  progress was  being made  in  key  areas. 
For example, of the eligible and potentially eligible initiatives in the work plan, 
there  were  119  performance  metrics  initially  reported.  Twenty‐two  of  these 
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it  was  not  feasible  for  Queensland  to  do  a  plan  for  each  community;  the 
Commonwealth accepted this. 
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3.63 Over time, changes were made to the reports provided, and this made 
it  difficult  to  assess whether  or  not  progress was  being made  in  key  areas. 
For example, of the eligible and potentially eligible initiatives in the work plan, 
there  were  119  performance  metrics  initially  reported.  Twenty‐two  of  these 
Reporting on Work Plan Delivery 
 
ANAO Audit Report No.24 2012–13 
The Preparation and Delivery of the Natural Disaster Recovery Work Plans for Queensland and Victoria 
 
77 
were  subsequently  discontinued  and  16  added.  There  were  other  gaps  and 
changes in reporting methodology in the reports submitted. While Victoria has 
advised  the  ANAO  that  the  data  contained  in  the  monthly  report  has 
progressively developed  and  evolved  over  time  and  performance  indicators 
have  been  established  that  are  ‘easy  to  be  collected’,  the work plan  has  not 
been updated. 
Reporting of progress against the work plan 
3.64 As  indicated  above,  the  NPA  and  the  work  plan  envisages  regular 
reporting  to  the Australian Government  to  facilitate monitoring  of  progress 
towards specified outcomes. Monthly reports prepared by Victoria specifically 
related  to  the work  plan. Accordingly,  the  reports  included  data  specific  to 
each of the initiatives listed in the work plan appendix. 
Aggregate Commonwealth financial liabilities 
3.65 At  the  time  the  work  plan  was  compiled,  eligible  and  potentially 
eligible  spending  for  Victoria  across  all  NDRRA  categories  was  between 
$560.3 million,  and  $623.5 million.  The  likely  cost  to  the  Australian 
Government,  under  the  NDRRA  cost‐sharing  arrangements76,  was  between 
$420 million and $468 million. 
3.66 The  cost  of  recovery  and  reconstruction  was  contingent  upon  the 
finalisation of  insurance  claims  and other offsets  from Victoria. However,  at 
the outset, Australian Government  liabilities under  the NPA were  forecast  to 
be less than the $500 million advance provided in May 2011. In June 2011, the 
Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance wrote to EMA to confirm that 
at  the  expiration  of  the  NPA,  any  difference  between  the  funds  claimed  as 
Commonwealth  assistance  and  the  advance  payment  would  be  repaid  by 
Victoria  to  the Commonwealth. Later advice  from EMA  to Victoria  indicated 
that, in view of the increasing damage estimates from current and past disaster 
events,  the unspent portion  of  the  advance  could  be  retained  by Victoria  to 
offset against later financial year entitlements. 
3.67 The overall financial position provided through the Victorian progress 
reports  is  shown  in  Figure  3.4.  This  figure  shows  that  the  overall  budget 
                                                 
76  Through the operation of the NDRRA cost share threshold. In the case of Victoria, the threshold for 
Category B is set at 50 per cent reimbursement of costs where the total exceeds $88.4 million and 
increasing to 75 per cent reimbursement of costs where the total exceeds $154.7 million per year. 
Category D cost share is subject to the terms of the agreement for each Category D proposal. 
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increased  from  $847 million  to  $992 million  over  the  period.  As  the 
expenditure  figures  were  updated  over  time,  the  remaining  budget  was 
adjusted to take account of accumulated expenditure and insurance offsets. 
Figure 3.4 
Victorian reporting – budget and expenditure year to date 
 
Source: ANAO analysis of Victorian progress reports. 
3.68 Figure  3.4  highlights  a  marked  variation  in  May  2012,  involving  a 
retrospective adjustment  to  the April 2012  expenditure  figures. The adjusted 
figure became the new baseline for expenditure reporting  for April, May and 
June 2012, with  consequential  impacts on  the  residual budget. There was no 
corresponding  change  to  the  overall  budget.  The  expenditure  reduction 
occurred in Category B, essential public assets. Victoria advised the ANAO in 
November  2012  that,  to  minimise  duplication  between  the  advances  and 
expenses paid, advances were removed from the total expenditure calculation. 
This  explanation  was  provided  to  the  Taskforce  in  the  email  covering  the 
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3.69 Although  expenditure  in  NDRRA  Category  B  was  adjusted 
downwards,  the overall budget estimate has  increased  from $656.2 million  in 




or estimates  for damages  from  the  floods.  In  June 2012,  four of  the 61 LGAs 
had  damage  estimates  reset  to  zero.  The  overall  damage  estimate  for  the 




Changes in Victorian LGA damage assessments 
 
Source: ANAO analysis of Victorian progress reports. 




covered  in the NPA. As  indicated  in Chapter 2, the work plan  initiatives also 
combined  activities  from  the  period  covered  by  the  NPA  with  those  from 


























State of Victoria - Monthly reporting
Victorian LGA Damage Estimate
  
ANAO Audit Report No.24 2012–13 




3.71 In  its  September  2012  Phase  2  report  examining  the  insurance 
arrangements  of  state  and  territory  governments  under  the  NDRRA 
determination77,  Finance  found  that  there  were  generally  well‐developed 
commercial  insurance  arrangements  to protect  the  non‐road  assets  of  states, 
but  there  remained  a  significant  gap  with  respect  to  the  insurance  of  road 
assets.  In  respect  to  Victoria,  the  review  found  that  the  state’s  insurance 
arrangements for non‐road assets were appropriate, cost‐effective for both the 




initial  Victorian  work  plan.  The  plan  stated  that  there  was  an  expected 




3.73 The  first  progress  report  shows  insurance  recovery  targets  of 
$122.5 million against a number of the eligible Category B initiatives from the 
work plan. No  insurance offsets were shown  in relation  to  the  initiatives  for: 
the  Charlton  Hospital;  local  government  roads;  and  the  Catchment 
Management Authorities  and Melbourne Water.  The Charlton Hospital was 
insured  through  the  Victorian  Managed  Insurance  Authority79  for 
$10.845 million. As well, the Annual Report for Melbourne Water states that it 
has a comprehensive  insurance portfolio.80 However,  the extent  to which any 
                                                 
77  http://www.finance.gov.au/publications/review-natural-disaster-relief-recovery-arrangements/docs/ndrra-
finance-phase-2-report-sep-2012.pdf [accessed 29 September 2012]. 
78  No explanation was provided by Victoria (or sought by the Taskforce) as to why insurance recoveries 
were expected to exceed the actual damage reportedly incurred to these items. In January 2013, Victoria 
advised the ANAO that the figure of $115 million was an error. 
79  A statutory authority reporting through the Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance. 
80  http://www.melbournewater.com.au/content/library/about_us/who_we_are/annual_report_2011-
12/MW_1040_Melbourne_Water_Annual_Report_2012_FA_All.pdf [accessed 18 October 2012]. 
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had  reported  that  insurance  recoveries  obtained  were  $60.15 million,  some 
49 per cent below that originally estimated.82 Up to the time of preparation of 
this ANAO  report,  the Taskforce has not  inquired  of Victoria  as  to whether 




                                                 
81  The damage assessment for Melbourne Water and the Catchment Management Authorities’ assets was 
$38.4 million. In November 2012, Victoria advised the ANAO that: Melbourne Water has a cost effective 
commercial insurance portfolio however this does not cover all asset types. The assets considered as 
part of the eligible expenditure are not covered by insurance.’ 
82  The monthly progress reports provided limited year-to-date information on the status of insurance claims, 
up to and including the May 2012 report which noted the Victorian government’s expectation that 
$123 million would be recovered through insurance. The June and July 2012 progress reports stated that 
it was anticipated that $102 million would be recovered through insurance. This was further reduced in 
the August 2012 report to $76.6 million, with $60.15 million recovered to that point in time. However, 
although the reduction in the June 2012 estimate was attributed to the ‘Flood recovery repair on public 
land’ initiative (revised from $23.83 million to $4.5 million), the initiative(s) with reduced insurance 
estimates in August 2012 were not identified and none of the insurance offset targets in the monthly 
report were amended to reflect the overall $25.4 million reduction. 
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Victorian work plan – insurance cover 
















Flood warning system recovery 7 141 800 11 - 
Flood recovery repair on public 
land 34 024 23 830 70 1 
Lower Loddon levees and bores 5 023 1 527 30 - 
Restoring and reopening 
Victoria’s parks 60 255 41 159 68 16 257 
Repair of flood damage to arterial 
roads 121 500 36 000 30 38 600 
Repair of flood damage to 
regional rail network 20 400 14 700 72 3 591 
Repair of Wilsons Promontory 
entrance to Tidal River 6 000 4 500 75 1 700 
Total 254 343 122 516 48 60 149 
Source: ANAO analysis of Victorian progress reports. 
Cost estimate revisions 
3.75 As discussed at paragraph 3.70 and illustrated at Figure 3.4, there were 
significant  estimate  variations  in  the  monthly  reports  provided  by  Victoria. 
However, there was no evidence that the data in the reports was analysed by 
the  Taskforce  to  develop  an  overall  financial  profile  of  the  assistance  being 




has  analysed  the  flood  recovery  performance  report  and  asked  for  further 
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Reporting on reconstruction progress 
3.77 The reports produced by QRA provide only limited visibility regarding 
progress towards completion of reconstruction in Queensland. Although QRA 
reports  against  the metric  ‘Works Complete’,  this  term  is not defined  in  the 
reports. Instead, the term ‘Works Delivered’ is included under the ‘Pipeline of 
Works Definitions’ and  is defined as  ‘Expenditure on packages  in delivery or 
completed’.  Accordingly,  although  QRA  reported,  for  example,  that  some 
$5.82 billion of works had been  completed  as  at November  2012,  this  figure 
overstates  the  actual  reconstruction  progress  as  it  includes  projects  that 






Progress against recovery plans for the most severely affected 
communities 
3.78 The fourth and final item that each NPA required be reported on by the 
states  each month  related  to progress  against  the  recovery plans  of  affected 
communities. In Victoria, this reporting was to relate to the recovery plans of 
the  most  severely  affected  communities  as  agreed  by  Victoria  and  the 
Commonwealth.  The  work  plan  identified  the  most  severely  impacted 
communities to be the shires of Central Goldfields, Buloke, Hepburn, Mildura, 
                                                 
83  Also in November 2012, Regional Australia advised that ‘The Taskforce questions the value of 
undertaking time series analysis of the available data. The analysis undertaken by the Taskforce to date 
has identified anomalies and issues that have been further investigated and, where relevant, resolved.’ 
In this regard, the ANAO observed that some analyses of the March, June and July 2012 reports (only), 
which included commentary on significant changes since the previous report, was included in the 
summary prepared by Victoria on the front of these reports. However, it was not apparent that the 
Taskforce had analysed the reports over the period in which they had been provided, identified 
anomalies, or raised and resolved issues in relation to the contents of the reports. 
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has  analysed  the  flood  recovery  performance  report  and  asked  for  further 
  
ANAO Audit Report No.24 2012–13 





3.79 Victoria advised  the ANAO  in November 2012  that although  specific 
information  was  not  requested  by  the  Taskforce,  information  concerning 
specific LGAs was available and in some instances, provided to the Taskforce. 
In  January  2013,  Victoria  further  advised  that  SOCG  meetings  have  been 
provided  with  regular  updates  regarding  LGA  progress.  Nevertheless,  the 
requirement of the work plan to include progress against the recovery plans of 
affected  communities  in  the  monthly  reports  was  not  met.  In  addition,  the 








the  requirements  of  the  NPA.  Rather,  the  Taskforce  has  relied  on  monthly 
reports prepared by QRA  for  the  state’s purposes. More  recent  reports have 
included data relating to natural disasters that occurred both before and after 









the value  of  each  such project.  Similar data has not been  reported  for  those 
projects being delivered by  state agencies.  In addition, QRA  reporting of  the 
value  of  projects  completed  includes  works  in  progress.  There  is  limited 
evidence of the Taskforce analysing the information that has been reported to 
it by Queensland.  Such  analysis  could usefully have  focused on  trends,  and 
would  beneficially  have  also  drawn  attention  to  the  lack  of  project‐specific 
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3.83 Victoria  has  also  consistently  provided  monthly  reports  to  the 
Taskforce. These  reports were broadly consistent with  the  terms of  the NPA. 
They included progress made with the initiatives contained in the work plan, 
together  with  updated  expenditure  reports.  However,  as  noted  at 
paragraph 2.62, a high proportion of the ‘initiatives’ listed in the work plan do 
not  identify specific reconstruction and recovery projects.  In addition, similar 
to  the  situation with  the  reports  from Queensland,  there  is no  evidence  that 
this data was analysed by the Taskforce in a systematic way. The reports also 
did  not  include  progress  against  the  recovery  plans  of  the  communities  in 
Victoria that had been identified as being the most severely flood‐affected. 
3.84 Transparency  and  accountability  was  also  less  than  originally 
envisaged, because of the inclusion by Victoria of recovery and reconstruction 
activities  originating  from  events  that  either  pre‐dated  or  post‐dated  the 
disaster events specified in the NPA. Ideally, these activities should have been 
separated. Although Queensland has commenced  this process, at  the  time of 
preparation  of  this  audit  report,  there  had  been  no  similar  move  in  this 
direction  in  relation  to  the Victorian  flood progress  reporting.  In  this  regard, 
Regional Australia advised the ANAO in January 2013 that: 
The  Department  agrees  that  the  work  plan  could  be  amended  to  exclude 
initiatives not  related  to  the  early  2011  flooding. Discussions with Victorian 
officials in relation to this have taken place. 
3.85 However,  the  department  did  not  advise  of  the  outcome  of  those 
discussions in relation to the work plan, nor whether the events covered by the 
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3.86 The ANAO  recommends  that  the Department  of Regional Australia, 





(b) undertaking  analysis of  relevant data  that has been  reported by  each 
state  over  time  to  identify  significant  trends  and  other  matters  of 
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Combined,  these disasters  caused  $7.5  billion  of damage,  resulted  in  37 deaths  and 
affected communities as distant as Cooktown in Queensland and Mildura in Victoria. 
All local government areas in Queensland were disaster‐declared. In recognition of the 
significant  investment  being made  by  the Australian Government  in  reconstruction 
under  the  Natural  Disaster  Relief  and  Recovery  Arrangements  (‘the  NDRRA’), 
including  more  than  $4.5 billion  in  advance  payments  to  kick‐start  recovery  and 
reconstruction,  two  National  Partnership  Agreements  (‘the  NPAs’)  were  negotiated 
with  the  Queensland  and  Victorian  Governments.  These  NPAs  put  in  place 
comprehensive  governance  and  oversight  arrangements  in  addition  to  the  usual 
NDRRA  arrangements  to  ensure  value  for  money  is  delivered  in  the  large  task  of 
rebuilding the disaster‐affected regions. 
The  focus  of  the  Commonwealth  and  both  States  has  been  on  ensuring  a  practical 
response  to  the  2010–11  disasters,  which  allowed  support  to  be  provided  to 
disaster‐affected communities as soon as possible for both recovery and reconstruction. 
The  priority  was  to  facilitate  the  flow  of  funds  under  the  NDRRA  to  enable 
communities to restore their economic and community assets in as short a timeframe 
as  possible.  Two  years  after  the  flooding,  significant  progress  has  been  made  in 
rebuilding  essential  infrastructure.  In  particular,  the  World  Bank  has  commended 
local,  state  and  federal  authorities  on  the  approach  taken  to  recovery  and 




of  the governance and oversight  framework –  the development of  the work plans – 
and  provides  no  insight  into  its  relative  importance  in  achieving  the  Australian 
Government’s objectives, as set out in the NPAs.84 
                                                 
84  ANAO comment: As explained in paragraphs 4, 1.6, 2.1 and 2.2, the requirement for work plans was 
jointly agreed by the Australian Government and the governments of Queensland and Victoria 
respectively. The work plans were part of the new oversight and accountability measures designed to 
ensure value for money would be obtained in the rebuilding of flood-affected regions. It was not a 
discretionary element of the NPAs that the work plans outline the specific set of reconstruction projects 
that were to be undertaken. 
Footnote continued on the next page… 
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The  report  argues  that  transparency  and  accountability  are  less  than was  originally 
envisaged. The Department strongly disagrees with  this and reiterates  that,  from  the 
Commonwealth’s  perspective,  the  level  of  oversight  and  assurance  across  the 
reconstruction programs in Queensland and Victoria far exceeds anything that existed 
prior – both within each State and between the Commonwealth and the States.85 






 the  Secretaries’  Steering  Committee  (the  responsibility  later 
transferred to the Secretaries’ Committee on Regional Australia); 







 two  Commonwealth  members  on  the  QRA  Board  (to  effectively 
represent the Commonwealth’s interests); 
                                                                                                                                  
Further, as outlined at paragraphs 1.11 to 1.14, the ANAO is undertaking three audits of key aspects of 
the NPAs signed with Queensland and Victoria in relation to natural disasters over the 2010–11 
Australian spring and summer seasons. Regional Australia was afforded the opportunity to comment on 
the proposed audit strategy during the development of ANAO’s published audit work program, and again 
at the commencement of the audits. 
85  ANAO comment: The audit report acknowledges that the work plans were an important element of new 
oversight and accountability measures adopted for flooding over the 2010–11 summer (see, for example, 
paragraphs 2 to 3 and 1.2 to 1.7). The audit objective was to assess the extent to which the disaster 
recovery work plans for Queensland and Victoria were prepared, and appropriate monitoring reports 
provided, in accordance with the relevant NPA. A key aspect of the additional accountability and 
oversight expected to be provided by a work plan was that the plan identify the set of specific 
reconstruction projects that would be undertaken. While the information that has been obtained on 
reconstruction projects is greater than would have been obtained in the absence of the NPAs, neither 
work plan identified the reconstruction projects that were being undertaken. The ANAO then examined 
whether other information provided to the Taskforce otherwise identified all reconstruction projects being 
undertaken in each state. Although information provided by Queensland has provided some project level 
information, this information has not fully satisfied the requirements of the NPA. Information on specific 
reconstruction projects has not been included in the reporting from Victoria. 
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 the  appointment  of  the  Minister  Assisting  the  Attorney‐General  on 
Queensland  Floods  Recovery  (later  the  Minister  Assisting  on 
Queensland Floods Recovery), Senator the Hon Joe Ludwig;  








result  of  the  new  oversight  arrangements.  While  much  of  the  reconstruction  in 
Queensland  is still underway and final costs are not yet known, more than $1 billion 
(representing  more  than  $750  million  to  the  Commonwealth)  in  value  has  been 
generated  as  a  result  of  the  Queensland  Reconstruction  Authority’s  (QRA)  robust 
value  for  money  and  eligibility  assessment  processes,  which  were  developed  in 
conjunction  with  the  Australian  Government  Reconstruction  Inspectorate  (‘the 
Inspectorate’).  An  additional  cost  reduction  of  an  estimated  $93  million  has  been 
achieved through the identification by the National Disaster Recovery Taskforce (‘the 
Taskforce’)  of  ineligible  expenditure  being  claimed  by  Queensland  state 
government‐owned  businesses,  and  a  further  $70 million  in  project  value  has  been 
generated  through  the  Commonwealth‐approved  use  of  internal  council  labour  for 
these events in Queensland, again driven by the Taskforce.86 
Significant  achievements  were  also  delivered  in  the  frameworks  put  in  place.  For 
example,  the  Inspectorate  provided  advice  on  the  development  of  the  QRA’s 
value‐for‐money framework in Queensland, which was subsequently adopted and has 
greatly  strengthened  the  governance  arrangements.  In  particular,  this  included  the 
addition of the criterion of local engagement in the value‐for‐money framework. 
In  addition,  the  improvements  to  the NDRRA Determination  recommended  by  the 
Taskforce  and  the  Inspectorate  as  the  reconstruction  efforts  rolled  out will  generate 
                                                 
86  ANAO comment: The achievements referred to in this paragraph and the following paragraph all relate 
to the conduct of value for money reviews of reconstruction projects in one state (Queensland). As noted 
at paragraph 1.13, a separate audit report is being prepared (and is expected to be tabled in the 2013 
Budget sittings) examining the Inspectorate’s value for money oversight activities in respect to 
Queensland reconstruction projects. This report will examine the benefits that have resulted from this 
work (the ANAO has already sought information from QRA on the methodology used to calculate the 
amount of costs reported as having been avoided and will similarly be examining the $93 million in cost 
reduction which the Taskforce has advised the Inspectorate represent profits being earned in respect to 
Queensland reconstruction projects sole-sourced for delivery by RoadTek (a state government entity). 
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86  ANAO comment: The achievements referred to in this paragraph and the following paragraph all relate 
to the conduct of value for money reviews of reconstruction projects in one state (Queensland). As noted 
at paragraph 1.13, a separate audit report is being prepared (and is expected to be tabled in the 2013 
Budget sittings) examining the Inspectorate’s value for money oversight activities in respect to 
Queensland reconstruction projects. This report will examine the benefits that have resulted from this 
work (the ANAO has already sought information from QRA on the methodology used to calculate the 
amount of costs reported as having been avoided and will similarly be examining the $93 million in cost 
reduction which the Taskforce has advised the Inspectorate represent profits being earned in respect to 
Queensland reconstruction projects sole-sourced for delivery by RoadTek (a state government entity). 
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further  significant  savings. On  top  of  these  program‐wide  savings,  the  Inspectorate 
and  the  Taskforce  have  identified  further  cost  reductions  in  the  course  of  the 
value‐for‐money assessments of individual reconstruction projects. 
Even  more  importantly,  the  high  level  of  effective  coordination  between  the 
Commonwealth  and  State  bodies  involved  in  the  reconstruction  programs  is 
noteworthy.  There  is  continual  monitoring  of  reconstruction  and  recovery  in  both 
States, and a continued dialogue on  the  issues by  the Commonwealth and  the States 
through  the  Queensland  Reconstruction  Authority  Board  and  the  Victorian  Senior 
Officials’ Coordination Group to ensure that the affected communities can rebuild. At 
an  interagency  level,  the  Taskforce  is  active  in  highlighting  emerging  issues  in 
reconstruction,  coordinating  a  whole‐of‐government  response  on  required  issues, 
providing  policy  advice  on  reconstruction  and  recovery,  and  negotiating  ongoing 
improvements in program delivery. 
And this work will continue through the reconstruction period. 
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Department of Primary Industries 
 
 
24 January 2013 
 
Ms Barbara Cass 
Group Executive Director 
Performance Audit Service Group 
Australian National Audit Office 
GPO Box 707 
Canberra ACT 2601 
 
Dear Ms Cass, 
 
Proposed audit report on the Performance Audit of the Preparation and 
Delivery of the Natural Disaster Recovery Work Plans for Queensland and 
Victoria 
 
In early 2011, Victoria experienced some of the most extensive and damaging 
storm events in its history. A partnership approach by the Victorian and 
Commonwealth Governments to provide recovery and reconstruction funding, 
together with effective and efficient governance and coordination mechanisms, 
have been instrumental in enabling communities to recover and rebuild. 
 
The flood events experienced by Victoria in 2011 and the governance and 
coordination arrangements established to guide reconstruction are significantly 
different to those relating to the Queensland floods. These differences were 
noted by Victoria's Deputy Premier, the Hon. Peter Ryan MP, in his letter to the 
Commonwealth Minister for Regional Australia, Regional Development and 
Local Government, the Hon. Simon Crean MP, in March 2011. 
 
Deputy Premier Ryan noted that Victoria was not establishing a separate 
authority to undertake recovery and reconstruction, consistent with its aim to 
keep the agreement as simple as possible and not create an unnecessary 
administrative burden. He also stated that given the large number of relatively 
small projects, procurement would not be centralised and for projects over 
$5 million Victoria will seek the view of the Australian Government 
Reconstruction Inspectorate. 
 
Following agreement to this approach by Minister Crean in April 2011, these 
arrangements were reflected in the intent and content of the National 
Partnership Agreement for Victorian Flood Reconstruction and Recovery, the 
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Victorian Flood Recovery Work Plan and the Protocol for Reviewing Victorian 
Reconstruction Projects agreed to between Victoria and the Commonwealth. 
 
As noted in the ANAO Audit Report, Victoria provided a comprehensive work 
plan and has consistently provided monthly reports to the Commonwealth.87 
 
The purpose of the Victorian Work Plan, agreed by Deputy Premier Ryan and 
Minister Crean, is to describe the approach taken by Victoria to coordinate the 
reconstruction and recovery of communities, economy and natural environment 
affected by the Victorian 2011 flood events. The Work Plan outlines Victoria’s 
locally-led recovery approach, governance and reporting arrangements and 
major recovery initiatives. The Work Plan also contains detail on Victoria’s 
reconstruction procurement arrangements and committed the State to regular 
reporting on expenditure to the Commonwealth. The monthly progress reports 
have included updates on matters such as damage estimates, expenditures, 
performance metrics and progress against initiative milestones and outcomes. 
 
The Victorian Flood Recovery Work Plan developed in consultation and 
agreement with Commonwealth agencies and in a manner consistent with the 
governance and coordination arrangements established to guide reconstruction 
in Victoria, outlines a set of recovery and reconstruction initiatives to meet the 
requirements of the NPA. The Work Plan clearly identifies the recovery and 
reconstruction initiatives towards which the Commonwealth Government is 
contributing funding. 
 
To meet the requirements of the NPA, Victoria has also provided the 
Commonwealth with project plans and strategies of reconstruction projects 
exceeding $5 million. Victoria’s view is that there is a common understanding 
between Victoria and Commonwealth agencies, consistent with the NPA, that a 
project refers to a single piece of infrastructure (a road, a bridge, etc.). In past 
discussions with the Taskforce, only one reconstruction project, the Charlton 
Hospital, was identified as exceeding the $5 million threshold. Victoria will 
continue to work with the Commonwealth Taskforce to ensure an efficient and 
effective approach in identifying appropriate reconstruction projects for value-
for-money review, consistent with the NPA and Protocol. 
 
                                                 
87  ANAO comment: The ANAO’s conclusions in respect to the Victorian work plan and reporting against 
the work plan are summarised at paragraphs 2.62 to 2.63 and 3.83 to 3.85 respectively. 
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Victoria has met the requirements of the NPA and Work Plan, as agreed to by 
the Prime Minister and Premier, and the Minister for Regional Australia, 
Regional Development and Local Government and Deputy Premier 
respectively. 
 
Victorian officials have a positive working relationship with the 
Commonwealth Taskforce. The Commonwealth Taskforce has taken a common 
sense and practical approach in discussions with Victoria. Victoria will continue 
to work productively with the Commonwealth Taskforce, and continue to 
ensure that data and reporting requirements are effective and not unnecessarily 






Chair, Senior Officials Coordination Group, 
 
Secretary 







For more information about DPI visit the website at www.dpi.vic.gov.au or call the 
Customer Service Centre on 136 186 
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Appendix 2: Queensland National Partnership 
Agreement Work Plan 
Work Plan 
1. The  National  Partnership  Agreement  for  Natural  Disaster  Reconstruction  and  Recovery 
(NPA) provides  that  each  State  that  is party  to  the NPA will prepare  a Natural Disaster 
Recovery Work Plan (Work Plan). 
Content of Work Plan 





b) To  allow  consistency between  the State Plan  and  the  requirements  for  the Work 
Plan under the NPA, it would be sufficient for Queensland to specify in the Work 
Plan high priority reconstruction projects in line with Part 2, Clause 5 of the NPA. 












6. From  time  to  time,  the  Commonwealth  may  require  additional  data  and  reporting,  in 
particular when  it  is preparing  the Federal Budget and  the Mid‐Year Economic and Fiscal 
Outlook (MYEFO). Requests for additional data and reporting will be made in writing from 
the Commonwealth to Queensland, and a reasonable response time will be provided. 
7. The parties have agreed  that  it will be  sufficient  for progress against  the Work Plan  to be 
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Appendix 3: Emergent Works 
Emergent Works 




later  data  series  supplied  by  QRA.  Analysis  of  the  CFO  reports 
illustrates the difficulties  in assembling the data required to assess the 
extent of project  completion, or progress  in key areas of expenditure. 
Figure  1  shows  the  different  data  series  used  in  reporting  NDRRA 
expenditure and Commonwealth liabilities for emergent works. 
Figure A1 
Emergent works — time series data 
 
Source: ANAO analysis of QRA CFO reports. 
2. Over  the period  June  to November 2011, a number of non‐contiguous 
data  sets  appeared  in  the CFO  reports. However,  for  this period,  the 
































































































QRA CFO Monthly Reports
Emergent Works Budget Estimate (First Series) Emergent Works Applications (Second Series)
Emergent Works Applications (Third Series) Emergent Works and CDO (from Report Body)
Value of Approved Emergent Works Applications
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works.  The  budget  estimate  component  is  the  first  series  shown  in 
Figure  A1.  However,  this  series  was  not  reported  again  after 
November 2011.  The  September  2011  CFO  report  states  that  the 
increase in (CDO and) emergent works had largely been driven by the 
number  of  emergent  works  applications  submitted  by  DTMR 
throughout the month. The report notes QRA’s expectation that the rate 
of increase is not expected to continue in the coming months. No other 






This  is  shown  in  Figure  A1  as  a  non‐contiguous  data  point,  as  a 
consequence of  further changes  to  the reporting metrics  introduced  in 
January  2012.  From  January  to  March  2012,  NDRRA  funding 
applications were  reported as  the value of applications  received,  sub‐
divided  by  LGA,  SDA  and  DTMR.  From  April  2012  there  were 
additional changes  to  the reporting metrics which  further sub‐divided 
the data  into  applications  received  and  approved,  and  by  asset  class 
(i.e.  roads,  sewerage,  etc).  The  value  of  approved  emergent  works 
applications provided  in  the CFO  reports  is also  shown  in Figure A1 
from the date it was provided, in April 2012. 
4. The CFO data shows that applications for emergent works continued to 
grow  over  time.  From  an  initial  budget  estimate  of  $183 million  in 
September  2011,  some  nine  months  after  TC  Yasi,  to  $604 million  in 
approved  applications 12 months  later, with a  further $115 million  in 
applications  on  hand  but  not  yet  processed.  The  increase  in 
applications  being  accepted  and  approved  does  not  appear  to  be 
consistent with QRA’s own guidelines for emergent works applications 
set out in the July 2011 CEO report, which states that: 
The  claim  amount  available  is  variable.  Emergent Works  submissions  to  be 
lodged within 6 months  from  the date of  the NDRRA activation  (extensions 
can be applied for in exceptional circumstances). 
5. One  of  the  general  conditions  for  Commonwealth  assistance  under 
NDRRA is that as far as practicable, assistance is designed to achieve an 
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efficient  allocation of  resources.88  In May  2012,  the Taskforce  advised 
the Inspectorate that: 
Submissions  for  emergent  works  require  significantly  less  evidence  than 
reconstruction works.  Essentially, NDRRA  payment  is  based  on  an  invoice. 
There  is  a  concern  that  the  lack  of  transparency  means  that  reconstruction 
could  potentially  be  included  within  emergent  works,  simply  because  they 
occurred in the first six months of an eligible event.89 
6. The Taskforce had earlier indicated that it had completed five Tier One 
(value  for  money)  assessments  of  emergent  works  projects  in 
Queensland.  However,  the  Taskforce  and  Inspectorate  agreed  to 
discontinue  assessing  emergent  works  applications  on  the  basis  that 
there is no requirement under NDRRA to submit detailed information 
in  regards  to  emergent  works.  As  discussed  earlier,  the  NDRRA 
determination90  is  silent  on  emergent  works.  It  is  defined  only  in 
Queensland  state  government  documents.  In  this  context,  the  CFO 
reports categorise emergent works as NDRRA Category B. 
7. The reduced documentary requirements for emergent works permitted 
by QRA  (but not NDRRA),  together with  the  lower  level  of  scrutiny 
that  QRA  applies  to  these  submissions  before  approving  them  for 
payment, would suggest that they require appropriate attention by the 
Taskforce  in  order  to  provide  reasonable  assurance  that  NDRRA 
eligibility requirements and value for money criteria are demonstrably 
being met. 
                                                 
88  NDRRA determination clause 4.1(b). 
89  Inspectorate meeting 10 May 2012 — Agenda Item 5. This advice was incorrect in relation to the 
timeframe specified. Queensland state procedures require that emergent works be conducted within 
60 days of the eligible event and that, unless an exemption has been granted on the basis of exceptional 
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88  NDRRA determination clause 4.1(b). 
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Appendix 4: Recovery and reconstruction — definitions 
1. For a program providing financial assistance, eligibility rules generally 
determine  the  scale  of  assistance,  in  accordance with  the  appropriate 
legal  or  policy  authority.  The  recovery  and  restoration  assistance 
provided by the Commonwealth through the NDRRA determination is 
established under Executive Authority. There  is no  special  legislation 
and the determination does not set out specifically where funds should 
be allocated.91 
2. The determination  sets broad  conditions  for Commonwealth  funding 
and defines natural disaster92, and eligible measures.93 When these two 
criteria are met, Commonwealth assistance will be provided, subject to 
minor  administrative  rules  set  out  in  the  determination,  upon 
notification  of  the  natural  disaster  to  the  Attorney‐General,  by  the 
affected state. 










                                                 
91  Attorney General’s Department, Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements Determination 
2011. The arrangements have been in place for about 30 years and the February 2011 determination 
replaced the 2007 determination. 
92  In the determination, natural disaster is defined to mean: a serious disruption to a community or region 
caused by the impact of a naturally occurring rapid onset event that threatens or causes death, injury or 
damage to property or the environment and which requires significant and coordinated multi-agency and 
community response. Such serious disruption can be caused by any one, or a combination of the 
following natural hazards: bushfire, earthquake, flood, storm, cyclone, storm surge, landslide, tsunami, 
meteorite strike, or tornado. 
93  In the determination eligible measure is defined to mean an act of relief or recovery that: (a) is carried out 
to alleviate damage or distress arising as a direct result of a natural disaster; and (b) is a type described 
as Category A, Category B, Category C or Category D measure in this part. 
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4. Restoration  of  essential  public  assets  is  also  further  defined.  The 
requirements for the restoration or replacement of an asset are: 











6. The NPA Outcomes set out above at  (a) and  (b)  introduce a  two‐step 
process:  repair;  and  replacement  or  restoration.  The  NDRRA 
determination only defines replacement and restoration.  In relation  to 
recovery,  the  NPA  Outcome  at  (c)  is  consistent  with  the  definition 
under  the determination. However,  later  reporting was not consistent 
with this definition. 
 
                                                 
94  Clause 14 of the NPA with Queensland and clause 12 of the NPA with Victoria. 
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4. Restoration  of  essential  public  assets  is  also  further  defined.  The 
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94  Clause 14 of the NPA with Queensland and clause 12 of the NPA with Victoria. 
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Current Better Practice Guides 
The following Better Practice Guides are available on the ANAO website. 
 
Public Sector Internal Audit  Sep 2012 
Public Sector Environmental Management  Apr 2012 
Developing and Managing Contracts – Getting the right outcome, 
achieving value for money 
Feb 2012 
Public Sector Audit Committees  Aug 2011 
Human Resource Information Systems – Risks and Controls  Mar 2011 
Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities  Mar 2011 
Strategic and Operational Management of Assets by Public Sector 
Entities – Delivering agreed outcomes through an efficient and 
optimal asset base 
Sept 2010 
Implementing Better Practice Grants Administration  Jun 2010 
Planning and Approving Projects – an Executive Perspective  Jun 2010 
Innovation in the Public Sector – Enabling Better Performance, 
Driving New Directions 
Dec 2009 
Preparation of Financial Statements by Public Sector Entities  Jun 2009 
SAP ECC 6.0 – Security and Control  Jun 2009 
Business Continuity Management – Building resilience in public 
sector entities 
Jun 2009 
Developing and Managing Internal Budgets  Jun 2008 
Agency Management of Parliamentary Workflow  May 2008 
Fairness and Transparency in Purchasing Decisions – Probity in 
Australian Government Procurement 
Aug 2007 
Administering Regulation  Mar 2007 
Implementation of Program and Policy Initiatives – Making 
implementation matter 
Oct 2006 
 
